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STEPHEN M. MCJOHN' 
The fair use doctrine of copyright law permits use of a copyrighted 
work without permission of the copyright holder. 1 Fair use authorizes 
one to tape a television program for later viewing,2 to write a parody of 
a copyrighted song,3 or to photocopy a law review article for research. 
It does not permit a magazine to publish key passages from a forthcom-
ing autobiography of President Ford,4 or permit a television station to 
copy and televise a news service's videotape of an assault,5 or permit 
a corporation systematically to make copies of academic articles in lieu 
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I. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. 1996). For comprehensive discussions of the fair 
use doctrine, see 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT ch. 10 (2d ed. 1996) (comprehensive 
analysis of fair use); BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 67-70 
(1967) (discussing development of the fair use doctrine and its relationship to overall 
infringement analysis); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT 13 (1996); WILLIAM F. PATRY, I COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 718-783 
(1994) (relating origins and development of statutory provision of fair use and collecting 
judicial interpretations); WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT 
LAW (1985) (thorough account of the development of the fair use doctrine in English 
and American courts) [hereinafter FAIR USE]; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the 
Fair Use Doctrine, IOI HARV. L. REV. 1661 (1988); see also DONALDS. CHISUM & 
MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4-175 to 4-222 
(1992) (clear and practical assessment of developments in fair use). 
2. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
3. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
4. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
5. See Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th. Cir. 
I 997). 
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of subscribing to the journals.6 As digital technologies expand the 
possibilities for creative works, the breadth of the fair use doctrine will 
affect the control given copyright holders. Although attempts have been 
made, the fair use doctrine has not been reduced to a single form 
susceptible of straightforward application. 7 Authorities regularly call 
fair use so malleable as to be indeterminate.8 For example, the 
application of fair use to photocopying is unsettled despite decades of 
litigation.9 Fair use cases seem to produce a disproportionate share of 
reversals and divided courts. 10 Accordingly, the demand is great 
among courts and commentators for a clear approach to fair use. 11 
In recent years, increasing support has coalesced for a view that 
promises to reduce fair use to a simple, elegant conceptual framework, 
which will be termed the "transaction cost approach."12 Under that 
6. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994). 
7. See, e.g., Jay Dratler, Disti/Ung the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright 
Law. 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233 (1988) (attempting to clarify fair use). 
8. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note I. at§ 13.05 [A], 3-156 to 3-159 (describing 
fair use's "infinite elasticity" and noting that it may not be applied predictably); see also 
Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformation of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 
1395, 1457 (1996) (describing fair use as an "already murky provision"); Fisher, supra 
note I, at 692-94 (criticizing fair use as vague, ambiguous, and fragmented); Lloyd L. 
Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. I 137, 
1137 (1990) (stating that fair use has baffled judges. lawyers, scholars, journalists, 
critics, historians, and publishers); William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use 
Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 
667-68 (1992) (collecting descriptions of fair use that describe it as "intricate and 
embarrassing," "troublesome," and full of "thorniness"). 
9. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (en bane), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997) (divided en bane Sixth Circuit 
opinion holding that fair use did not authorize making of photocopied course pack 
materials from various sources); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 37 F.3d 881 
(2d Cir. 1994); Eric D. Brandfonbrener, Note, Fair Use and University Photocopying: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing v. New York University, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 669 
(1986) (describing early difficulties in applying fair use to photocopying). 
10. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 
(1990). 
I I. Id. at I 106-07. 
12. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) (visited May 27, 1998) 
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii> [hereinafter White Paper]. For 
commentators applying several variations of the transaction cost approach to fair use, see 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note I. See also Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1600 (1982) [hereinafter Fair Use]; I. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) 
in Cvberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
An Economic Analysis of Copyright law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 357-61 (1989) 
(economic analysis employing transaction cost approach to fair use, although balancing 
approach to copyright generally used in the article). These commentators' approaches 
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view, fair use should only apply to overcome certain narrowly defined 
cases of market failure-settings where transaction costs impede 
voluntary licensing agreements. 13 That approach would narrow the 
application of fair use-and further narrow it with increasing use of 
networked communications, on the grounds that transaction costs shrink 
as the links between parties increase in number and speed. 14 That 
narrower view of fair use is reflected in judicial decisions, 15 academic 
commentary16 and proposed amendments to adapt the copyright statute 
could be interpreted as giving a considerably different scope to fair use. For an 
economic argument at the opposite end of the copyright protection spectrum, see Stephen 
Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyrights in Books, Photocopies, 
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) (questioning the need for 
copyright as an incentive for publication of many types of works). See also Barry W. 
Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A 
Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. I 100 (1971) (arguing copyright is 
necessary to protect publishers against free-riders). For a general analysis of the need 
for copyright law, see Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The 
Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 
(1989) [hereinafter Inquiry] (comparing a hypothetical legal regime of no copyright law 
with present regime). 
13. See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 12. For sharp criticism of the White 
Paper's legislative proposals, see JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS 
136-39 (1996). See also Jessica Litman, Copyright in the Twenty-First Century: The 
Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29 (I 994) (criticizing proposed 
extensions of copyright's exclusive rights and questioning interpretations of existing 
law); Henry 0. Towner, Comment, Copyright on the Information Highway: A Critical 
Analysis of the Proposed Amendments to the Copyright Act, 7 REGENT U. L. REV. 261 
(1996). 
14. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG To 
THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 224 (1994). 
15. See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 
1995) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 198-205); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air 
Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (6th Cir. 1978) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 215-
19). 
16. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14; Fair Use, supra note 12; Hardy, supra note 12. 
See also Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property: 
Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 (1995). Just how far the privatization 
approach would extend depends on how broadly it construes market failure. For 
example, fair use could remain relatively broad if market failure included refusals to 
license by authors for nonfinancial reasons or for reasons of strategic advantage. See 
Fair Use, supra note 12, at 1632-35 (discussing "anti-dissemination motives" as a barrier 
to voluntary transactions); Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoners 
Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853 (1992) (demonstrating 
how strategic behavior may prevent licensing in various contexts). Another approach 
would be to take a more broadly critical analysis of transaction cost theory, together with 
an analysis of the "public good" nature of copyright. Cf Jeffery Atik, Complex 
Enterprises and Quasi-Public Goods, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus L. 1 (1995). 
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to the world of networked digital communication. 17 Even commenta-
tors less sympathetic to expanded copyright have noted an apparent 
narrowing of fair use. 18 
The transaction cost view of fair use, as Part I explains, takes the 
"tragedy of the commons," a celebrated insight about real property, and 
seeks to apply to it to intellectual property. 19 Where property is held 
in common, with unlimited access to all, individuals may use it 
wastefully, because they do not bear the costs.20 In addition, because 
access is free, no market mechanisms form to channel resources toward 
the highest valued use. The transaction cost approach takes a similar 
view of the intellectual property created by copyright. In this view, 
permitting fair use of a copyrighted work is, to the extent of that use, 
tantamount to holding the work in common, leading to inefficient 
overuse of the resource and blocking pricing signals. Accordingly, fair 
use should be limited to situations where transaction costs impede 
licensing transactions. In one elegant conceptualization, fair use serves 
simply as "a compulsory license provision with a royalty of zero,"21 
applicable in situations where the copyright holder would not have 
received a royalty anyway because of transaction costs. Such situations, 
in the view of many, will become fewer and fewer as technology lowers 
transaction costs by facilitating the dissemination and licensing of 
copyrighted works. In a world where copies can be distributed world-
wide and software can be used to form licensing contracts ( such as 
17. The policies underlying proposed legislation to adapt copyright to such media 
as the Internet are set forth in the White Paper, supra note 12. The White Paper 
suggests that fair use should be narrowed in light of copyright management technology 
and further states that the burden of showing fair use should rest on the user. See id. at 
73, 82. 
18. See, e.g .. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. 
L. REV. 1197 (1996) (suggesting copyright expansion is due to both interest-group 
politics and rhetoric that enforces consolidation of entitlements); Cate, supra note 8, at 
1423 (arguing fair use as currently applied is unlikely to mitigate "the technological 
extension of the exclusive right to reproduce"); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining 
Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 546 (1996) ("As 
Congress and various courts have expanded the scope of the author's protected interest, 
so too have they narrowed the scope of the fair use doctrine."). Professor Robert P. 
Merges has recently suggested that, because the market failure approach leads to a 
narrowing of fair use with new technologies, fair use analysis should shift to 
emphasizing redistribution, seeing fair use as a means to subsidize certain classes of 
uses. See Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the 
"Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. I 15, 133-35 
(1997). 
19. See Hardy, supra note 12, at 218. 
20. See DAVID w. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 28-32 (1992) (discussing inefficient incentives that can be created by 
common property rights). 
21. Hardy, supra note 12, at 240. 
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clicking on an icon to accept terms), the need to apply fair use will 
shrink, 22 Accordingly, fair use would gradually give way to licensed 
uses, 23 Such reliance on market-oriented economic theory has been 
termed a "neoclassical" view24 or a "property rights" approach to 
copyright 25 Because it holds that extending copyright protection as far 
as markets can reach will ultimately benefit all, it has been called the 
view of "copyright optimists,"26 Considering this Article will be 
primarily interested on its effect on public domain, the term "privatiza-
tion" will be utilized, 
This Article argues against a narrowing of the fair use doctrine, Part 
II discusses how differences between real property and intellectual 
property undercut the application of the tragedy of the commons to the 
fair use setting, While real property is a limited resource, intellectual 
property is not The same parcel of land may not support an unlimited 
number of grazing sheep, But making one more copy of a book does 
not destroy other copies (although it may reduce their market value),27 
The ideas in the book, indeed, may gain value from use, refinement, and 
propagation, Thus, the same public good28 nature of works of author-
ship that justifies intellectual property also differentiates it from real 
property, Moreover, the boundaries in copyright are far more uncertain 
than those around a parcel of land, Copyright demarcates protected 
22. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 197-236; Hardy, supra note 12, at 240. On the 
proposition that networked communications will reduce transaction costs, see I. Trotter 
Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cybenpace," 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 1033-36 
(1994). See also Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 311, 
323 (1995). On the adaptation of copyright to the Internet generally, see Eugene 
Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995) (discussing 
social consequences of networked communications and legal ramifications). 
23. See also Cate, supra note 8, at 1425 (discussing how digital payment 
technologies and proliferation of markets may reduce the scope of fair use doctrine). 
24. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE 
L. REV. L.J. 283, 306-14 (1996). 
25. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1044-47 (1997). 
26. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 14-18. 
27. See Breyer, supra note 12, at 288-89 (distinguishing copyright from tangible 
property on the basis that concepts such as congestion and limited amounts are 
inapplicable). 
28. The general justification for intellectual property is that public goods may be 
underproduced. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 112-15, 
141-44 (1988). On implications of the public good approach for software copyright, see 
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 885, 921-22 
(I 992). 
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subject matter with elusive distinctions-originality, abstraction, and 
functionality. 
Part II further addresses the theoretical underpinning of the transaction 
cost approach, the idea that copyright should be maximally privatized.29 
Under that view, concentrating control in the hands of the author by 
constricting fair use would most efficiently exploit the resource. But this 
view overlooks factors that can prevent copyright holders from 
permitting many uses. First, transaction costs are not the only obstacle 
to licensing valuable uses. Issues of status,30 risk aversion, and other 
obstacles to negotiations could obstruct licensing of many productive 
uses. 31 Second, increases in electronic commerce and communications 
will lower some types of transaction costs, but many components are 
likely to remain unaffected. Accordingly, the Internet will not yield the 
frictionless marketplace postulated by the transaction cost view. 
Reducing the scope of fair use could create deadweight loss to produc-
tive uses. 32 
29. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 229 (arguing for "extending copyright into 
every corner of economic value"); Hardy, supra note 12, at 217 (arguing that copyright 
should be employed to privatize intellectual property as much as possible). Copyright 
property theorists draw from such ground-breaking work in economics as Harold 
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) and 
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. ECON. 265 
(1977). For a broad critical analysis of the implications of property rights theory for 
intellectual property law, see Lemley, supra note 25, at 1044-47. See also Laurie 
Steams, Comment, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism. Process, Property and the Law, 80 CAL. 
L. REV. 513 (I 992) (criticizing application of property metaphor to words). 
30. Considerations of status can interfere with negotiation of mutually beneficial 
bargains. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. I (1992); see 
also Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: 
An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994) (describing empirical 
investigation of interpersonal comparisons interfering with negotiation of agreements). 
31. The question of whether voluntary transactions can reliably shift intellectual 
property efficiently also goes to the heart of another core issue of copyright protection, 
whether copyright entitlements should be protected by property or by liability rules. See, 
e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2655 (1994) (discussing transactional difficulties and institutional responses in 
intellectual property). For a reexamination of the received view of the effect of legal 
rules on bargaining, see Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Rules as Auctions: Property, 
Proposing Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, I 06 YALE L.J. 703 (1996) (proposing that 
property rules and liability rules are special cases of a more general class of rules). 
Another open issue, key to the scope of copyright, is the extent to which state contract 
law is preempted by federal copyright law. See, e.g., David Rice, Puhlic Goods, Private 
Contract, and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software Licenses Prohibitions 
Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543 (1992): Brandon L. Grusd, Note, 
Contracting Beyond Copyright: Pro CD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353 
(1997) (analyzing recent case of first impression). 
32. The public domain is itself a key resource for the further production of creative 
works. See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors, and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual 
Property and the Public Domain, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS I, 191 (1994-1995); 
66 
[VOL. 35: 61, 1998] Copyright 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Part III discusses an alternative, the balancing view of fair use, which 
relies on a different view of the property created by copyright, 33 The 
transaction cost view conceptualizes intellectual property as a single 
resource that can be split up in pieces and identified with the copies of 
the work, But the rights under copyright are not coextensive with the 
physical copies, Others remain free to copy the ideas expressed in a 
copyrighted work, 34 the functional aspects of the work, and the facts 
from the work. 35 Fair use has served as a device to ensure that the 
copyright owner's control over the expressive aspects of her work do not 
extend to the noncopyrightable aspects. 
Part IV compares the transaction cost view and the balancing view of 
fair use in the context of a number of live issues: whether a temporary 
copy in a computer's memory infringes copyright, how much legal 
protection should be afforded copy protection technology, how broad the 
exclusive right to make derivative works should be, whether one could 
archive the World Wide Web, and the application of fair use to 
photocopying and other means of reducing the costs of disseminating 
copies. This Article will conclude that, although the transaction cost 
approach might simplify fair use analysis, it would do so by undercutting 
certain core limitations on copyright. Rather than shrinking away in the 
digital age, fair use should continue to be a means to implement the 
balances struck by copyright law. 
Jessica A. Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Paul J. Heald, 
Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, and New 
Arrangements of Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241 (1996); David Lange, 
Recognizing the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981 ). See also Francis 
M. Nevins, The Doctrine of Copyright Ambush: Limitations on the Free Use of Public 
Domain Derivative Works, 25 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 58 (1981). 
33. See infra text accompanying notes 144-88. 
34. See, e.g., Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 
56 TENN. L. REV. 321 (1989). 
35. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend 
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1995); Baker v. Selden, IOI U.S. 99 
(1879). For applications of that venerable doctrine to new technology, see Peter S. 
Menell, An Analysis of the Scope ofCop_vrightfor Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 1045 (1989). See also J. H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific 
Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University 
Research, 42 V AND. L. REV. 639 ( 1989); Timothy S. Teter, Merger and the Machines: 
An Analysis of the Pro-Compatibilitv Trend in Computer Software Copyright Cases, 45 
STAN L. REV. 1061 (1993). 
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I. THE TRANSACTION COST APPROACH TO FAIR USE 
As the following parts will discuss, the scope of fair use depends on 
the relationship between fair use and the other limitations on copyright. 
The transaction cost approach views fair use as an autonomous doctrine, 
which functions only to rectify certain market failures. This Article will 
argue that fair use plays a more integral role in copyright law, giving 
effect to the other limitations. As a prelude to that discussion, this Part 
sketches the doctrinal place of fair use in copyright law and describes 
the transaction cost approach to the doctrine's proper scope. A number 
of works describe the historical development of fair use in case law and 
legislation.36 Accordingly, this Part focuses on the place of fair use 
among the various limitations on the subject matter and exclusive rights 
of a copyright. 
A. Fair Use and the Other Limitations on Copyright 
The privatization approach would make fair use independent of the 
other limitations on copyright, by making transaction costs the primary 
focus of fair use analysis. Because this Article will argue that fair use 
is more closely related to the other limitations, this section first outlines 
the overall structure of copyright law. The author of an original work 
of authorship receives the copyright in the work.37 Copyright's broad 
scope extends to the entire range of creative works: letters,38 history 
books,39 paintings,40 songs,41 video games,42 movies,43 and com-
puter programs.44 The copyright holder has a number of exclusive 
36. See sources cited supra note I. 
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. 1996). 
38. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding 
biographer's use of J.D. Salinger's unpublished letters was not protected by fair use); 
Mary Sarah Bilder, The Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 STAN. L. REV. 299 
(1991 ). 
39. See, e.g., Toulmin v. Rike-Kumler Co., 316 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1963). 
40. See, e.g., Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'! Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62 
(3rd Cir. 1978) (wildlife paintings). 
41. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1946) (involving an 
infringement action of Cole Porter compositions "Begin the Beguine" and "My Heart 
Belongs to Daddy"). 
42. See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (applying fair use to a device that made various changes in play of video 
game). 
43. See, e.g., Steward v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (l 990) (involving a fair use case of 
Alfred Hitchcock's film, Rear Window). 
44. The extent of copyright protection afforded computer programs is subject to 
evolving case law. See Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software 
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rights.45 Only the holder of the copyright may make copies of the 
work, make derivative works, distribute copies of the work to the public, 
Copyright?, IO HIGH TECH L.l I (1995); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v, Leadership Software, 
Inc., 12 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 1994) (joining "consensus" among courts that non-literal 
elements programs were protectable, but not defining the extent of such protection); 
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Plains 
Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(holding copyright not applicable to the functional structure of a computer program); 
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986) (an early 
case, frequently criticized, that held "structure, sequence, and organization" of computer 
programs were copyrightable expression). For sharply different views on how broad 
copyright protection for software should be, compare Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright, 
Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 33 (1987) (arguing 
that copyright law should forbid only near-literal copying) and Anthony L. Clapes, et al., 
Silicon Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection 
for Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REY. 1493 (1987) (arguing that computer 
programs should receive protection as broad as literary works generally). See also 
Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process or Protected Expression?; Determining the 
Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV. 
866 (I 990); David C. Tunick, How to Avoid Infringing the Copyright of a Computer 
Program: From the Perspective of a Computer Programmer Turned Attornev/Law 
Professor, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1996) (discussing permissible borrowings from 
existing programs under recent interpretations of software copyright); Annotation, 
Copyright Protection of Computer Programs Under Federal Copyright Laws, 70 A.LR. 
FED. 176 ( 1997). Copyright analysis could benefit by more precise attention to computer 
science concepts. See Randall Davis, The Nature of Software and Its Consequences for 
Establishing and Evaluating Similarity, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 299 ( 1992); Marci A. Hamilton 
& Ted Sabety, Computer Science Concepts in Copyright Cases: The Path to a Coherent 
law, IO HARV. J.L. & TECH. 239 (1997); see also William F. Patry, Copyright and 
Computer Programs: It's All In The Definition, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. I 
(1996) (calling for courts to be stricter in applying statutory terms in software cases). 
45. Title 17 of the United States Code section I 06 provides that: 
[T]he owner of the copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and 
authorize any of the following: 
(I) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the 
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to 
display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. 
17 U.S.C. 106 (1995 & Supp. 1996). 
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or publicly display the work or perform the work in public.46 Thus, if 
an author has written a play, then others may infringe the copyright by 
making copies of the play, making a movie derivative of the play, 
distributing copies of the play, performing the play in public, or 
displaying the text to the public. But the control over the work granted 
by copyright is far from total. The prerogatives granted are limited to 
the exclusive rights listed in the statute. Others may make use of the 
copyrighted work in ways that do not fall within the exclusive rights. 
One does not need permission to read a copyrighted book or write about 
a copyrighted painting. 
A number of subject matter limitations also cut into the scope of the 
copyright. A copy of a play contains copyrighted expression subject to 
the author's exclusive rights, but the copy also embodies much that is 
not subject to protection. First, copyright protects only original 
expressive elements.47 Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court 
held there was no infringement where the maker of a telephone directory 
copied another directory's factual listings of names and numbers because 
an author does not create facts. 48 The originality requirement also 
limits the protection given fictional works, which necessarily use 
elements that are not the author's original expressions.49 To the extent 
a work incorporates nonoriginal elements such as commonplace plot 
devices, others are free to copy such elements without the permission of 
the copyright holder.50 
Another profound limitation is the rule that copyright does not restrict 
the use of ideas.51 The author's copyright protects only expression; 
others are free to copy or apply the author's ideas.52 A pair of opinions 
by Judge Learned Hand best illustrate the rather elusive distinction. In 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation,53 Judge Hand held there 
was no infringement where the second author copied such elements as 
a quarrel between Jewish and Irish fathers, marriage of their children, 
reconciliation, and some stock characters. By contrast, in Sheldon v. 
46. 17 U.S.C. § I 06 (I 995 & Supp. 1996). 
47. Copyright subsists "in original works of authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1995). 
48. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
49. See Litman, supra note 32. 
SO. Id. 
51. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 356-59 (1991); 
Jane C. Ginsburg, "No Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of 
lnfor11111tion After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992). 
52. See generally Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's Total Concept and Feel, 38 
EMORY L.J. 393 (1989). 
53. 45 F.2d 119 (2nd Cir. 1930). 
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Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corporation,54 the copying was more specific. 
The second author took more than the plot of the play, in which a young 
woman poisoned an overly ardent lover but won acquittal after some 
friendly perjury, the author took the specific events and details of 
various scenes such as the use of a gaucho song as an aphrodisiac, 
conveniently mislaid poison, and a thwarted attempt to make a telephone 
call for aid. 
The distinction between copyrightable expression and noncopy-
rightable ideas carries over to the line of cases under Baker v. Selden, 
now codified in the copyright statute.55 These cases hold that the 
functional aspects of a work are unprotected by copyright, but its 
aesthetic, expressive aspects are protected. The lower level of protection 
afforded works with functional aspects has become especially important 
as copyright law has been extended to computer software. It is 
established that one cannot simply copy every byte of a copyrighted 
program and sell copies, but how much protection copyright affords 
beyond that is unsettled. 56 
The originality requirement and the nonprotection of ideas are limits 
on each of the copyright holder's exclusive rights. The Copyright Act 
further provides specific limits applicable to only some of the exclusive 
rights. The copyright owner's exclusive rights to distribute and display 
the work are subject to the first sale doctrine, which provides that the 
54. 81 F.2d 49 (2nd Cir. I 936). 
55. IOI U.S. 99 (1879). 
56. Recent years have seen several distinct judicial approaches to software 
copyright. See Lemley, supra note 44. Most issues remain unsettled. Cf Pamela 
Samuelson, Reflections on the State of American Software Copyright Law and the Perils 
of Teaching It, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 61, 66 (1988) (listing open issues in 
software copyright, most of which remain open). For example, an interesting question 
is the extent of copyright protection that could be available for original elements of a 
programming language. See Elizabeth G. Lowry, Copyright Protection for Computer 
Languages: Creative Incentive or Technological Threat?, 39 EMORY L.J. 1293 (1990); 
Richard H. Stern, Copyright in Computer Programming Languages, 17 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 321 (I 99 I). On whether copyright is suited to protection of 
software, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority 
of Copyright Over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software, 94 C0LUM L. REV. 
2559 (1994) and Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection 
of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994). See also Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy's Approach to In.formation Products: Muscling Copyright and 
Patent Into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 195; A. 
Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright Than for Patent Protection of Computer 
Programs, 72 NEB. L. REV. 351 (1991). 
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owner of a lawfully made copy may display or dispose of that particular 
copy.57 Thus, the owner of a painting may display the painting or sell 
it. The public display and performance rights are subject to a number 
of specific exceptions. Although the author of a song generally has the 
exclusive right to perform it in public (whether live or through a 
recording), the statute authorizes performances in face-to-face nonprofit 
teaching, in religious services, during charitable events, or by playing a 
modestly sized radio in a business. 58 Some limitations are geared to 
specific types of copyrightable works. The copyright in an architectural 
work is not infringed by taking a picture of a building visible to the 
public.59 The copyright in a computer program is not infringed if the 
owner of a copy of the program makes a copy in order to use the 
program or to have a back-up copy. 60 
The fair use doctrine is a general limitation on all the copyright 
holder's exclusive rights. Without the author's permission, someone 
may make copies (or make derivative works, or perform the work, or 
display or distribute copies) if the activity qualifies as fair use. 61 
Rather than attempt to define fair use, the copyright statute lists 
particular uses likely to qualify as fair use: criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.62 Whether a use falls 
into one of the favored categories, however, does not determine whether 
it is a fair use. A use outside the categories may qualify as fair use, and 
a use within a favored category may fail to qualify. The statute further 
requires a court to consider four factors drawn from a nineteenth century 
opinion by Justice Story:63 
57. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1995). Computer programs and recordings of music have 
been partially excepted from the first sale doctrine, for fear of rampant copying. 
§ 109(b); see Kenneth R. Corsello, The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 
1990: Another Bend in the First Sale Doctrine, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 177 (1991). One 
could use fair use to fashion a digital equivalent of the first sale doctrine, on the grounds 
that it is fair use to make a new copy provided that the first copy is destroyed. Cf Mark 
Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights 
Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137, 145-46 
(l 997) (discussing the conceptual difference between copying to reproduce and to 
transfer). 
58. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1995). 
59. 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (1995). 
60. 17 u.s.c. § 117 (1995). 
61. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1995). 
62. id. 
63. In short, we must often. in deciding questions of this sort. look to the 
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the 
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or 
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work. 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (D. Mass. 1841 ). 
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(I) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
( 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work.64 
The provision does not provide particularly clear guidance in deciding 
whether a particular use qualifies. A court must first decide whether the 
use falls into one of several broad and vague categories. The court is 
then to apply four factors, but not told how to weigh any of the factors 
against each other. Accordingly, fair use is considered difficult and 
unpredictable. 65 
The greatest uncertainty of fair use is where it fits in the overall 
framework of copyright law. The next section discusses how the 
privatization approach to copyright would make fair use independent of 
the other limitations on copyright by making transaction costs the 
primary focus of fair use analysis. 
B. The Transaction Cost Approach to Fair Use 
Although this Article will argue that the transaction cost approach 
results in an unsatisfactory and narrow view of fair use, the approach 
does have some merit in that it reduces a tangled doctrine to a clear 
conceptual framework. Under the transaction cost approach, the primary 
question would be whether defendant's use could have occurred by 
obtaining a license from the copyright holder. If defendant could have 
sought permission from the copyright holder, then fair use would be 
unlikely to apply. If transaction costs or other narrowly defined market 
failures would have prevented a voluntary transaction, then fair use 
would be more likely to apply. 
The transaction cost approach rests on the paradigmatic justification 
for private property, the "tragedy of the commons," which demonstrates 
how dividing resources into privately owned parcels can lead to greater 
64. 17 U.S.C. § I 07 (1995). 
65. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 25, at 992 (describing fair use as "fraught with 
uncertainty"). 
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social welfare than holding the resources in common. One might think 
that public ownership of property with unrestricted access to all would 
permit the greatest social benefits. But where property is held in 
common, meaning everyone may use it freely, there are great incentives 
for inefficient behavior. 66 Individuals are likely to consume resources 
without taking into consideration the costs. Classic examples are 
littering, over-grazing, and pollution. Where property is privately held, 
an individual both receives the benefits and bears the costs of a 
particular use, so the individual has an incentive to use the property as 
efficiently as possible. If another individual can get greater benefit from 
that particular piece of property, then the second individual may 
purchase it. Thus, privatization of property has two primary functions. 
First it internalizes costs and benefits, increasing the chances that 
resources will be used efficiently.67 Second, it permits markets to form, 
permitting resources to flow, through voluntary transactions, to the 
highest-valued use. 68 The transaction cost view of fair use takes a 
similar view of the intellectual property created by copyright. Under 
that approach, copyright privatizes intellectual property by according the 
copyright holder the bundle of exclusive rights. Concentrating the rights 
in one place gives the copyright holder an incentive to exploit them in 
an effective manner. If someone else can make more valuable use of 
any or all of the rights, then the other may pay for an assignment of the 
copyright or a license of some of the: rights. Indeed, permitting others 
to use the work without the copyright holder's permission would 
interfere with the formation of market mechanisms.69 
Fair use, under that view, is a narrow exception to the "privatization" 
of intellectual property.7° Fair use would apply only where transaction 
costs interfere with the centralized control through licensing with the 
copyright holder. Such applications of fair use have been put into two 
categories. 71 In the first, no agreement is reached because the transac-
66. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LA w 32-35 ( 4th ed. I 992) 
(discussing how creation of exclusive property rights provides incentives for efficient use 
of resources). 
67. See id. at 33-35. 
68. See id. at 33 (discussing how transferability of property rights permits 
allocative efficiency). 
69. Cf Inquiry, supra note 12, at 1393 ('The entitlement package is more than just 
a way to give the author incentives to produce in the first instance. It also organizes the 
way already-produced works are rationed and coordinated."); Hardy, supra, note I 2. at 
234-40, 252-53 (arguing that concentrating entitlement in copyright holder facilitates 
efficient transactions and use of work). 
70. Hardy, supra note 12, at 240-42 (explaining that transactions that are usually 
amenable to fair use are trivial or undertaken for unusually worthy purposes). 
71. GOLDSTEIN, supra note I, at 10.1. 
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tion costs to arrange the license would exceed the potential benefit For 
example, a daily newspaper seeks to print two paragraphs from a 
textbook in a book review, 72 The costs of arranging to get permission 
from the textbook author (delay, communication, and negotiation) would 
likely exceed the benefit of the use, meaning that if permission were 
necessary the newspaper might likely forego the use, The second 
category of uses that might be obstructed by transaction costs occur 
when the user does not capture the entire benefit of the use, and thus 
might not be able to pay for a license,73 Some uses of a copyright 
work, such as teaching, criticism, or research, benefit not just the 
immediate users but society generally, But a teacher, a critic, or a 
researcher may not be able to get the rest of society to pay for the 
diffuse benefits flowing from their use of the work; the transaction costs 
of dealing with all members of society and figuring out how much each 
benefitted would be prohibitive, A license might be available, but the 
fee might be prohibitive because it could not be recovered from the 
ultimate beneficiaries, In both categories, allowing the use under fair 
use would not harm the copyright holder, because by hypothesis a 
licensing transaction was not feasible, Conversely, the transaction cost 
approach would deny fair use even to valuable uses if they could have 
been licensed, In many such cases, voluntary licensing would result in 
both the realization of the social value and compensation to the 
author,74 As one influential law review article framed it, fair use would 
apply only where three conditions are met: "(I) market failure is present; 
(2) transfer of the use to the defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an 
award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of 
the plaintiff copyright owner,"75 
So viewed, fair use is analogous to various real property doctrines that 
have also been justified by the existence of transaction costs, 76 The 
owner of real property normally has the right to exclude others from her 
property. Others who enter must have her permission, or commit 
trespass. In a situation of necessity, however, such a voluntary 
transaction may be impossible. Accordingly, the doctrine of necessity 
72. Id. at 10.1.1. 
73. Id. at 10.1. 
74. Fair Use, supra note 12, at 1615. 
75. Id. at 1614. 
76. See Inquiry, supra note 12, at 1392. 
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permits entry without the perm1ss10n of the landowner.77 Fair use, 
under the transaction cost approach, is considered to play a role similar 
to necessity: it applies where transaction costs block a beneficial, 
voluntary license. By the same token, fair use, under such a view, 
would be as strictly limited as the privileges to use others' real property. 
If the doctrine of necessity were too widely applied, then people could 
use the property of others without seeking permission. Such externalities 
would lead to the same inefficiencies as the tragedy of the commons. 
Likewise, if fair use is applied where permission could have been 
sought, then intellectual property would be used inefficiently. 
The transaction cost approach diverges dramatically from the 
traditional approach to copyright law, which has generally seen copyright 
law as setting a balance between the incentives given to authors and the 
costs of access to the public. 78 The greater protection copyright law 
gives copyright holders, the greater the cost of access to those works for 
consumers and other authors who use copyrighted works.79 Thus, 
analysis of copyright law frequently speaks of striking a balance, 
whether it be between authors and the public, or between authors and 
subsequent authors. Along the same lines, analyses of the fair use 
doctrine have often spoken of the need to balance competing interests.80 
The transaction cost approach would generally eschew such balancing 
analysis, leaving choices about resource allocation to be answered by 
market mechanisms. A defendant would not be able to argue for fair 
use by showing that the benefits from her use outweighed the detriment 
to the copyright holder. Rather, under the transaction cost approach, if 
such a surplus existed, then presumably the defendant would be able to 
pay for a license. Only if the transaction costs were greater than the 
potential surplus might fair use be applicable-and even then, only if it 
did not harm the plaintiff. 81 
77. POSNER, supra note 66, at 174. 
78. See, e.g., Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright 
Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1995). 
79. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 12 (analyzing copyright law in terms 
of weighing incentives to authors against costs to other authors). 
80. See, e.g., Paul Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics 
of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 972 (1991) ("Whereas the fulcrum of the 
economic balance struck by patent law is the standards for patentability, the most 
important economic pressure point in copyright law is not the question of 
copyrightability but the question of fair use."); see also Mark A. Lemley, Romantic 
Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873, 889-90 (1997) 
(discussing fair use as analogous to patent law mechanisms that balance incentives of 
intellectual property). 
8 I. See supra text accompanying note 75. 
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The transaction cost approach thus seeks to shift the balancing from 
the province of the courts to that of the market Rather than having 
judges decide whether the benefits of a use outweigh the decreased 
incentives to authors, allocation would be left to market mechanisms, 
Under this view, someone who believes they have a valuable use for a 
creative work would presumptively back up their belief with a willing-
ness to pay ( or ability to persuade the copyright holder to permit the use 
without requiring a fee), Accordingly, fair use would be applied as 
sparingly as possible, because permitting people to use copyrighted 
works without a license interferes with the ability of market mechanisms 
to allocate resources through pricing information, From the copyright 
holder's point of view, how much others are willing to pay for particular 
uses provides the information necessary to decide how best to make use 
of the creative work, 
Such a view also represents a shift from the traditional view of the 
role of copyright law, The conventional view is that copyright served 
as an necessary incentive for authors to produce creative works; 82 the 
transaction cost approach extends the role of copyright law to providing 
a baseline for the efficient exploitation of works that have already been 
produced, Such a view has implications for copyright beyond fair use, 
A brief discussion of copyright duration will serve to contrast the 
privatization and balancing approaches, Proposed legislation before 
Congress would extend the duration of a copyright by some twenty 
years, 83 Under the present statute, an individual author's copyright 
lasts for the life of the author plus fifty years, and the copyright in a 
work-for-hire lasts seventy-five years from the year of publication,84 
Pending legislation would extend those terms to life-plus-seventy and 
ninety-five years respectively, 85 Such extensions would apply to 
82, See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 29 (early formulation of the incentive analysis of 
intellectual property); Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 357-58 (setting up framework 
for incentive analysis of copyright law doctrines). 
83. For information on the proposed legislation, together with criticism of the bill, 
see Dennis Karjala, Opposing Copyright Extension (visited Feb. 3, 1998) 
<http://www.public.asu.edu/~dkarjalal>. For trenchant criticism, on the grounds that 
extension would benefit mainly "a very small group: children and grandchildren of 
famous composers whose works are beginning to fall into the public domain," see 
William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907,932 (1997). 
84. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. 1996). 
85. Copyright Term Extension Act, H.R. 604, 105th Cong. 2 (1997). 
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copyrights presently existing, as well as future copyrights. 86 Under the 
incentive-to-produce approach, applying the extension to existing 
copyrights would be unnecessary; no additional incentive is necessary 
where the works have already been produced.87 Moreover, the 
lengthened term for future copyrights also has little justification from the 
incentive point of view. Whether an author's copyright will outlive her 
by fifty or seventy years will have little effect on her decision on 
whether to write a book or create a painting. If one accepts the 
privatization rationale, however, such legislation would seem more 
justified. Extending the term of copyright leaves it in private hands 
longer before it falls into the public domain, meaning that the copyright 
holder retains an incentive to find the most productive use of the 
copyright. Under such a view longer copyright terms would provide 
incentives for investment in new uses and for allocation of works to the 
highest-valued use. 
The transaction cost approach to fair use would similarly support 
increasing the scope of copyright protection. One way to effectively 
increase the scope of the copyright holder's exclusive rights is to narrow 
the limitation provided by fair use. An increase in copyright duration 
would require legislative action. The narrowing of fair use, however, has 
been begun by more restrictive judicial opinions among the lower courts, 
underpinned by academic commentary.88 Two Supreme Court opin-
ions, Harper & Row Publishers, Incorporated v. Nation Enterprises89 
and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Incorporated,90 can be interpreted 
to support the transaction cost approach,91 although this Article will 
argue in Part III for a broader reading of the opinions.92 Harper & 
Row held fair use inapplicable where the defendant magazine, the 
Nation, had printed several hundred words of former President Gerald 
Ford's autobiography without permission shortly before it was to be 
86. See id. 
87. See Karjala, supra note 83. 
88. See sources cited supra note 12. 
89. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
90. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). For further discussion on parody and fair use, see Fisher 
v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Anastasia P. Winslow, Rapping 
on a Revolving Door: An Economic Analysis of Parody and Campbell v. AcujfRose 
Music, Inc., 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 767 (1996); Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell: 
Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79 (1991); A. 
Hunter Farrell, Note, Fair Use of Copyrighted Material in Advertisement Parodies, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1550 (I 992). 
91. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 307 n.98 (arguing that Harper & Row adopted 
a neoclassical economic view that would restrict fair use to "highly circumscribed 
instances of bilateral market failure."). 
92. See infra text accompanying notes 144-88. 
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published. The Court observed in a footnote that some economists have 
written that fair use should apply only where the market will not 
function, 93 The Court also quoted a noted study of fair use that 
concluded the core issue was, "would the reasonable copyright owner 
have consented to the use?"94 One can interpret that as supporting the 
proposition that fair use should apply only where a reasonable copyright 
holder would have permitted the use, had transaction costs not interfered. 
The support Campbell lends to the transaction cost approach is more 
indirect. Campbell held that 2 Live Crew's parody version of "Oh, 
Pretty Woman" could be a fair use of the original version of the song. 
Such a result is consistent with the transaction cost interpretation of the 
parody cases. Making a parody of a copyrighted song constitutes 
making a derivative work, which would normally be within the 
prerogatives of the copyright holder. But, just as transaction costs can 
block a licensing agreement, so could the fact that the parody makes fun 
of the original song. 95 An author is unlikely to license another song 
that parodies their work, and is also unlikely to write a parody of their 
own work.96 Permitting the parody under fair use permits a use 
without costing the author any revenue (because the author would not 
have granted a license), the same reasons that justify applying fair use 
in settings of prohibitive transaction costs generally. Although 
permitting the parody does undercut the owner's ability to control 
productive uses, it does so only in an area where the owner is unlikely 
to exploit the work. So Campbell's result can be seen as agreeing with 
the transaction cost approach. But the next section raises the objection 
that the author's reluctance to permit a parody seems inapt to cases, like 
Campbell, where the copyright was no longer held by the original 
author. More generally, this Article will argue the transaction cost 
93. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 n.9 (citing T. Brennan, Harper & Row v. The 
Nation, Copyrightability and Fair Use, DEPT. OF JUSTICE ECONOMIC POLICY OFFICE 
DISCUSSION PAPER 13-17 (1984)); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 C0LUM. 
L. REV. 1600, 1615 (1982). 
94. Id. at 550 (quoting ALAN LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHT WORKS (1958), 
reprinted as Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 14-16, prepared for 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 15 (1960)). 
95. Richard A. Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992). 
96. See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure 
and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993); Landes & Posner, 
supra note 12; Winslow, supra note 90. 
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approach underestimates both the complexities of the boundaries of 
copyright and the obstacles to obtaining permission to use copyrighted 
works. 
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE TRANSACTION COST APPROACH 
The transaction cost approach to fair use relies on a view of copyright 
that creates easily traded parcels of intellectual property.97 In order to 
see that such property is used by the highest valued use, the parcels are 
allocated to the copyright holder, who can sell any or all to the highest 
bidder. By analogy to real property, thorough privatization of intellectu-
al property is a necessary condition to permitting market mechanisms to 
a form that will facilitate the most efficient exploitation of intellectual 
property.98 This Part first argues that the analogy to real property is 
undermined by the nature of the boundaries of copyright, which are far 
more difficult to determine that those of physical property. It may be 
easy to identify copies of a copyrighted work, but a copy is not 
coextensive with the property right. The Part next argues that the 
transaction cost approach overestimates the fluidity of markets for 
intellectual property. Although some transaction costs may be reduced 
in an era of networked communications, others will increase. Moreover, 
other obstacles to transactions exist beyond the basic costs of arranging 
licenses.99 
A. Boundaries 
The rationale for privatizing property relies on readily identifiable 
borders. 100 The boundaries of physical property are generally rather 
straightforward to determine. 101 The boundaries of real property are 
97. For a critique of the economic conceptualization of property, see MARGARET 
JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996). 
98. See Hardy, supra note 12, at 219; see also Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and 
Benefits; Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 472-73 
(1992) (arguing that concentrating rights in copyright owners facilities efficient use by 
requiring prospective users of the work to bargain with copyright holders). 
99. The arguments and assumptions of the property rights argument, as applied to 
treatment of improvements of copyrighted works, have been criticized on the grounds 
that various obstacles to market transactions exist. See Lemley, supra note 25, at 1048-
69 (discussing difficulties of identifying and organizing improvers, and obstacles 
imposed by transaction costs, uncertainty, externalities, strategic behavior, noneconomic 
incentives, and problems of market power and hold-ups). 
100. See Hardy, supra note 12, at 234-36. 
IOI. See, e.g., Inquiry, supra note 12, at 1378-84 (discussing physical edges of 
tangible property and intellectual property's functional equivalents); see also Timothy 
P. Terrell & Jane Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and 
Economic Analysis of the lnheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. I, 24 (1985) (discussing 
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readily described by metes and bounds or other methods. The boundaries 
of a piece of physical personal property are readily apparent. The owner 
of a car can tell where the car ends and the pavement begins. Conver-
sion and nuisance, the core torts involving property rights, are both 
notoriously difficult to define. 102 But the material that is the subject 
of the property right is itself usually easy to identify. Boundary drawing 
problems are the exceptional cases, such as in concepts of commingling 
or accessions, where personal property has been mixed together. 103 
The transaction approach to fair use assumes that property boundaries 
in copyright are readily identifiable, but this assumption misses the 
distinction between the physical copies of a work and the property rights 
afforded by copyright. For example, the notion that the Internet will 
drastically reduce transaction costs rests on the assumption that a copy 
of a copyrighted work, encoded with information on contacting (or just 
paying) the copyright holder will readily identify the copyrighted 
property to be licensed. But a copy of a copyrighted work is not like a 
parcel of property. Rather, every copy unavoidably contains both 
copyrightable elements and noncopyrightable elements that are not the 
copyright holder's to sell. 104 Rather than the readily ascertainable 
boundaries of physical property, the intellectual property afforded by 
copyright is demarcated by the notoriously indeterminate boundaries of 
the originality requirement and the idea/expression distinction. The 
non original elements in the copy and any ideas ( or functional elements, 
or facts, or methods of operation, and so on) are not part of the 
copyright holder's interest. One can hardly discern those by examining 
the copy in isolation. 105 Where commingling and accessions are 
relatively uncommon problems in dealing with physical property, 
intellectual property's lack of "thingness" compared to tangible property). 
102. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 35, 
765 (1982) (describing conversion as highly technical and quoting a description of 
nuisance as an "impenetrable jungle") (quoting Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 
362 N.E.2d 968 (1977)). 
103. See U.C.C. §§ 9-314, 9-315 (1997) (complicated statutory scheme attempting 
to address competing interests where goods become accessions, i.e., goods installed in 
or affixed to other goods). 
104. But see Hardy, supra note 12, at 246-47, 260 (acknowledging boundary-
drawing problems posed by the idea/expression dichotomy, but concluding that the cost 
of drawing borders will be no higher for informational property than for real property). 
105. See, e.g., Heald, supra note 32 (discussing the difficulty of determining how 
much of a published new arrangement of a musical work is public domain material and 
how much is protected). 
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analogous problems inhere with every copyrighted work, because each 
work combines original expression with nonprotected elements. The 
boundaries are abstract and vague. With respect to originality, the 
boundary may be so uncertain as to be impossible to draw. 106 Every 
creative work necessarily incorporates nonoriginal elements. 107 The 
line between copyrightable expression and noncopyrightable ideas is 
likewise elusive. In the leading case on the distinction between ideas 
and expression, Judge Learned Hand stated that it was necessarily an ad 
hoc determination: "Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and 
nobody ever can." 108 
It is no easier to determine which aspects of a work are 
noncopyrightable functional aspects. Courts have faced difficult 
decisions in drawing that line, holding that an artistically appealing belt-
buckle is copyrightable, 109 but that a model of a human torso used to 
model clothes was not. 110 A light stand with fanciful dancing figures 
serves a function but has sufficiently separate aesthetic aspects to be 
copyrightable, 111 but a light fixture with an abstract shape was held to 
be functional and thus noncopyrightable. 112 Courts have similar 
problems with computer programs. 113 The recent cases, culminating 
in the Supreme Court's indeterminate four to four split in Lotus v. 
106. See Litman, supra note 32, at 1023 ("Copyright law purports to define the 
nature and scope of the property rights it confers by relying on the concept of originality. 
In fact, originality is an apparition; it does not, and cannot, provide a basis for deciding 
copyright cases."); see also BOYLE, supra note 13, at 163-64 (discussing how intellectual 
property law has manipulated the concept of originality). 
107. See, e.g .. Yen, supra note 90. It is also difficult to decide how much original 
contribution is required to qualify for copyright. A court recently held that the West 
Publishing Company·s versions of federal court opinions did not qualify as "original 
works of authorship," where West had added minor changes to the case captions, the 
names of judges and attorneys. and other factual material. See Matthew Bender & Co. 
v. West Publ'g Co., No. 94,0589 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1997). The court thus did not 
follow a heavily criticized opinion that had accorded West protection in its arrangement 
of cases and internal pagination, and denied fair use. See Oasis Publ'g Co. v. West 
Publ"g Co., 924 F. Supp. 918 (D. Minn. 1996). 
108. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
I 09. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
110. See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. I 985). 
11 L See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
112. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
113. See, e.g .• John W.L. Ogilvie, Note, Defining Computer Program Parts Under 
Learned Hand"s Abstractions Test in Software Copyright Infringement Cases. 91 MICH. 
L. REY. 526 (1992). Leading cases in the area include: Apple Computer v. Microsoft, 
35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 
(9th Cir. 1991); Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding 
that an operating system program may be copyrighted, because there are many ways to 
express the same functions). 
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Borland, have given little definitive guidance. 114 Courts readily agree 
that the functional aspects of a computer program are not protected, but 
have been unable to formulate any clear guide for separating the 
functional aspects from the expressive aspects. 115 The leading case on 
point, Computer Associates, 116 formulated a test that simply restates 
the abstractions analysis. 117 Indeed, some commentators have argued 
that software's inherently functional aspect makes it sufficiently different 
from other creative works to require a new form of intellectual property 
protection. 118 The fact that copies of works necessarily contain both 
copyrightable and noncopyrightable elements leads to another a problem 
that Part III will suggest is addressed by fair use. 119 The copyright 
114. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'], Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (]st Cir. 1995), ajf'd by 
an equally divided court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (]996) (holding that a spreadsheet program's 
menu command structure was not copyrightable subject matter); see also Bateman v. 
Mnemonics, 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996) (similar); Engineering Dynamics v. Structural 
Software, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995) (restricting copyright to nonfunctional elements 
of user interface); Glynn S. Lunney. Jr., Lotus v. Borland: Copyright and Computer 
Programs, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2397 (1996); Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User 
Interfaces, and Section 102/b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v. 
Paperback, 6 HlGH TECH. L.J. 209 (I 992); Robert L. Bocchino, Jr., Note, Computers, 
Copyright, and Functionality: The First Circuit's Decision in Lotus Development Corp. 
v. Borland International, Inc., 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 467 (1996); Michael J. Schallop, 
Comment, Protecting User Interfaces: Not as Easy as 1-2-3, 45 EMORY L.J. 1533 
(1996). 
115. On the difficulties courts have faced, see Peter G. Spivack, Comment, Does 
Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of 
Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. REV. 723 (1988). See also Dennis M. Carleton, A 
Behavior-Based Model.for Determining Software Copyright Infringement, 10 HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 405 (] 995). 
116. Computer Assoc. Int'! v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2nd Cir. 1992); see also Jon S. 
Wilkins, Note, Protecting Computer Programs as Compilations Under Computer 
Associates v. Altai, 104 YALE L.J. 435 (1994). 
117. Subsequent decisions have found Computer Associates persuasive. See Mitek 
Holdings v. Arce Eng'g Co., 89 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1996) (addressing, as an issue of 
first impression for the circuit, the scope of copyright protection for nonliteral elements 
of computer programs); Engineering Dynamics v. Structural Software, 26 F.3d 1335 (5th 
Cir. 1994); Autoskill v. National Educ. Support Sys., 994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1992). 
On applying the abstraction testing to software, see David W. T. Daniels, Comment, 
Learned Hand Never Plaved Nintendo: A Better Wav to Think About the Non-Literal, 
Non-Visual Software Copyright Cases, 61 U. CHI. L. REY. 613 (1994). See also Richard 
A. Beutel, Software Engineering Practices, and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy: Can 
Structured Design Methodologies Define the Scope of Software Copyright?, 32 
JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1991) (attempting to distinguish between functional and descriptive 
elements). 
118. See Samuelson et al., supra note 56. 
l 19. See infra text accompanying notes 144-88 (regarding fair use). 
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holder's control over copies of the work may lead to control over 
noncopyrighted aspects of the work, especially with respect to digital 
works that are generally disseminated as undifferentiated copies. 
The uncertainties of boundaries in copyright counsel against expanding 
the exclusive rights by narrowing fair use. The privatization rationale 
is sharply undercut if property boundaries are unclear. Privatizing 
property is a means to provide the owner an incentive to find the most 
efficient use of the property. To the extent that the owner is unsure 
where the boundaries lie, or unaware of how broadly the boundaries 
have been extended, the incentive to exploit that intellectual property is 
undercut. 120 At the same time, to the extent others are unsure whether 
certain uses are protected by copyright or whether they fall in the public 
domain, potential users are discouraged by the chance that their activity 
may be infringement. Expanding copyright would likely exacerbate 
boundary drawing problems. To the extent that the exclusive rights of 
copyright holders are expanded at the expense of the public domain, 
uncertainties about the borderline cases will also increase. 
B. Transaction Costs 
The other premise of the transaction cost approach is that voluntary 
transactions will lead to more efficient exploitation of creative works 
than permitting fair use. 121 Markets, whether for copies of works or 
for licensing uses and derivative works, indeed play the primary role in 
disseminating creative works, both with respect to the copyrighted 
aspects "belonging" to the author and to the noncopyrighted elements 
unavoidably carried along. But the transaction cost approach, which 
would rely almost exclusively on voluntary transactions as long as 
transaction costs were no obstacle, greatly underestimates the obstacles 
to voluntary transactions in some settings. First, even world-wide 
networked communications will not diminish many aspects of transaction 
costs. More important, other impediments remain, such as risk aversion, 
status considerations, and information costs. 122 
120. Cf Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory, IO 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 423, 437 n.37 (1992) (discussing how welfare maximizing 
effects of property entitlements may be offset by bargaining costs introduced by 
vagueness in copyright entitlements). In some settings, a little uncertainty about a legal 
entitlement may promote bargaining. See Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules 
Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, 
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, l04 
YALE L.J. ]027 (1995). 
121. See infra text accompanying 144-88 (regarding fair use). 
122. One can question the validity of applying fair use only in situations where 
transaction costs prevented a license. Because litigation costs are even greater: 
84 
[VOL. 35: 61, 1998] Copyright 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
The transaction cost approach suggests that increased use of digital 
technologies will dramatically lower transaction costs, which would 
justify a narrowing of fair use, 123 In the near future, many or most 
copyrighted works could be in digital form for dissemination over 
communications networks, or networks of networks such as the 
Internet 124 Copyright holders could readily post the terms on which 
works could be licensed, including various prices for different uses and 
conditions on use, 125 Thus, a potential user would often need to do 
little more than click a mouse to license a use. In such a world, the 
argument runs, transaction costs will be so low as to drastically reduce 
or even eliminate fair use and other exceptions to the copyright holder's 
exclusive rights. 126 But that argument views transaction costs narrow-
ly, from the view of the copyright holder. It contemplates that the 
copyright holder will set a schedule of charges and offer it to potential 
users. A user who did not fall into one of the listed categories, or had 
a potential use that the copyright holder had not contemplated, would 
still have to attempt to contact the copyright holder and negotiate an 
individualized license. 127 In a world where copyright holders increas-
ingly rely on mechanical licensing, such individualized requests may 
indeed be less likely to receive full consideration. A related problem is 
that expanding the prerogatives of the copyright holder permits the 
holder to appropriate all the surplus value from new uses of the work, 
even where part of such value arises from the independent contribution 
of others. 
It is hard to imagine a plaintiff bringing a lawsuit (much less going all the 
way to the Supreme Court) over a use small enough that she would have been 
willing to license it but for transaction costs. The absurd implication of this 
theory is that in any case important enough to be litigated, fair use should 
never apply! 
Lemley, supra note 25, at 1077 n.394. 
123. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14 at 197-236; Hardy, supra note I, at 259-60; see 
also Benjamin R. Kuhn, A Dilemma In Cyberspace and Beyond: Copyright Law for 
Intellectual Property Distributed Over the Information Superhighways of Today and 
Tomorrow, 10 TEMP. INT'L. & COMP. L.J. 171 (1996); see also Cate, supra note 8, at 
1425 (discussing how digital technologies could reduce the scope of fair use in licensing 
transactions). 
124. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 197-236. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 223-24. 
127. Negotiating and executing a license for such intellectual property as software 
can be expensive and time-consuming. See Lemley, supra note 25, at I 053-54. 
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One initially appealing argument for stringent limits on fair use, 
particularly on the Internet, is that it would support publication of 
material for small, specialized audiences. 128 Considering there might 
only be a few people world wide that are interested in an esoteric 
subject, if fair use allowed even a few people free access to the work, 
it would greatly reduce the necessary incentive to produce the work. 
Thus, the argument runs, restriction of fair use will permit much greater 
diversity of expression. But the argument goes too far. Restricting all 
fair use in order to protect a few esoteric markets is unnecessary. The 
effect on the market for the copyrighted work is a key factor in fair use 
analysis, but one can distinguish between different markets. A small use 
that threatened to destroy an entire small market would be unfair; a 
small use that had little effect on a large market might be fair. 
Other market failure explanations of fair use have similar flaws. As 
discussed above, parody is often seen as a classic example of fair use 
justified by market failure. 129 An author is unlikely to license another 
work that parodies their work, so the presumptive reliance on voluntary 
transactions will not work. But a closer examination undermines this 
analysis. Campbell shows that parodies often could be licensed. In 
Campbell, the subject of the parody was a song by Roy Orbison. By the 
time the parody was written, the copyright was in the hands of Acuff-
Rose. This is not an exceptional case. 130 Because of the work-for-hire 
rule 131 and transfers of copyright, 132 many if not most significant 
copyrights are in the hands of corporate owners rather than individual 
creators. 133 The copyright in a work frequently is transferred by the 
author. In the case of works for hire, the copyright vests not in the 
actual author but in the employer. If making a parody of such a work 
is a viable commercial project, then the sensibilities of the copyright 
holder (as opposed to the original author), would often be no obstacle. 
Moreover, in the cases where the original author is the copyright owner 
128. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 229-30. 
129. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96. 
130. On parody and fair use, see Roxana Badin, Comment, An Appropriate(D) 
Place in Tran.,formative Value: Appropriation Art's Exclusion From Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1653 (1995). See also L. Ray Patterson, Free 
Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
13 1. The copyright in a work made for hire rests in the employer, not in the 
individual that creates the work (unless otherwise agreed upon). 17 U.S.C. § 20l(b) 
(1995). 
132. Copyrights may be transferred in whole or in part. 17 U.S.C. § 20l(d) (1995). 
133. See Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 873,883 (1997); Lemley, supra note 25 at 1033-34 n.212 (estimating that 
more than 40% of copyrights are works made-for-hire, on the basis of early study and 
recent trends in copyrighted works). 
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and refuses to license a parody, terming that market failure is too broad, 
A rational author might well refuse to take money in exchange for 
subjecting their creations to distortion and ridicule, 134 So the transac-
tion cost explanation of parody is both overbroad and too narrow, 
The next Part suggests that a better explanation lies in using fair use 
to permit free flow of uncopyrightable ideas. 135 More generally, the 
privatization rationale behind the transaction cost approach to fair use 
proves too much. If fair use should be narrowed in order to maximally 
privatize copyright, then the same reasoning would support narrowing 
other limitations on copyright. In particular, logical extension of the 
privatization argument would argue for narrowing the basic rule that 
copyright does not protect ideas. If intellectual products are most 
effectively exploited by converting them into property, then to some 
extent ideas should be copyrightable. But ideas are better developed by 
making them freely available for use, criticism, and development by all. 
Before turning to an alternative conception of fair use, there are 
additional fundamental objections that might be made to the transaction 
cost approach. Even if privatizing copyright were more efficient than 
permitting a broader scope for fair use, one could argue against it simply 
on distributional grounds, that granting greater initial entitlements to 
authors is sufficiently inequitable to overcome any efficiency justifica-
tions. Second, one could turn away from the incentive analysis of 
copyright law to other philosophical frameworks. The privatization 
approach to copyright, which logically supports considerable expansion 
of the right of copyright holders, has led some to reject economics as a 
basis for prescriptive analysis of copyright law. Such commentators 
argue instead for a natural rights approach 136 or see copyright as 
134. See Lemley, supra note 25; Yen, supra note 90. See also Margaret Jane 
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (discussing how personal 
value of property may be more important to the owner than financial aspects). 
135. See infra text accompanying notes 172-78. 
136. Professor Wendy J. Gordon has written leading explorations of both economic 
and natural law bases for copyright. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Se/f-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of' Intellectual Property, I 02 
YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). See also Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright 
as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990) (arguing that natural law is 
inherent to copyright). A natural rights approach could support a considerably narrower 
copyright than an economic property rights approach. See Gordon, supra. See also R. 
Anthony Reese, Note, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives on 
Copyright Duration and Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707 (1995) (applying Lockean 
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intended to foster a utopian society137 or a civil democratic soci-
ety.138 This Article will argue in a more pragmatic fashion that 
arguments for maximal privatization of copyright (which support the 
transaction approach to fair use) fail on their own terms. Natural rights 
analysis might provide a more satisfactory philosophical basis for 
copyright than economics does, but consideration of natural rights is less 
likely to provide a guide to specific applications of fair use. It seems 
rather unlikely that sufficient consensus will form any time soon on the 
content of natural rights or even on whether natural rights are simply 
"nonsense upon stilts." 139 One could also construct an argument 
against the privatization approach on constitutional grounds. Congress 
is authorized to promote knowledge by granting copyrights to authors 
and patents to inventors. 140 One could interpret that provision as 
limiting copyright to measures providing an incentive to produce 
works. 141 The Supreme Court has stated that Congress lacks power to 
authorize patents that remove knowledge from, or restrict access to, the 
public domain. 142 The same limitation could be applied to the copy-
natural rights analysis to the issue of copyright duration). Other critics of the broad 
approach of copyright law have relied on literary theory rather than natural rights to 
argue that copyright places too much emphasis on an illusory view of the creative 
contribution of individual authors. See BOYLE, supra note 13; Peter Jaszi, Toward a 
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455. 
137. See Fisher, supra note I. 
138. See Netanel, supra note 24; see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social 
Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS 
& ENT. L.J. 215 (1996); Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights 
and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841 (1993). 
139. Steven D. Smith, Nonsense and Natural Law, in AGAINST THE LAW I 04 (1997) 
(quoting Jeremy Bentham in the discussion of a natural rights framework for discussing 
the Constitution). A basis for a critical theory of copyright might be a Lacanian 
analysis, which has to date been employed much less in legal than in literary theory. 
See DAVIDS. CAUDILL. LACAN AND THE SUBJECT OF LAW: TOWARD A PSYCHOANA-
LYTIC CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY 3-25 (1997) (discussing barriers to and benefits of 
applying Lacanian framework to legal theory). 
140. The Constitution authorizes Congress "to Promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See Heald, 
supra note 32, at 251 (suggesting that it may be unconstitutional to use copyright other 
than to provide incentives for new creations); see also Margaret Chon, Postmodern 
"Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 
( 1993) (suggesting that the Constitution grants a right of access to knowledge). 
I 41. Cf Cate, supra note 8, at 1396 ("The Copyright Clause requires the 
government to carefully tailor those rights to not provide excessive incentive to the 
creation and dissemination of expression."). 
142. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I (1966); see also Tung Yin, Reviving 
Fallen Copyrights: A Constitutional Analysis of Section 5I4 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act of 1994, 17 LOY. L. A. ENT. L.J. 383, 393 (1997). 
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right power, which is in the same clause of Article I of the Constitu-
tion. 143 Expanding fair use at the expense of the public domain would 
arguably violate that limitation. Until such time as the Court speaks to 
potential constitutional or philosophical arguments, however, the fair use 
doctrine will play the primary role in determining the extent of the 
privatization of copyright 
III. FAIR USE AS A MEANS TO IMPLEMENT OTHER 
COPYRIGHT LIMITS 
This Part argues that the fair use doctrine has a broader role than 
conceived by the transaction cost approach. Certainly, fair use can be 
justified by prohibitive transaction costs in many settings where a 
potential user could not reasonably locate, contact, and negotiate with the 
copyright holder and other affected parties. Thus, the existence of 
transaction costs may justify as fair use many de minimus uses that the 
copyright holder would not object to, such as copying a story from the 
day's newspaper to send to a friend. But this Article will argue that the 
role of fair use is broader and more central to the overall structure of 
copyright law. Under the transaction cost approach, the balance between 
the interests of copyright holders and potential users is set by the 
requirements of originality, the idea/expression distinction, and the other 
limits on copyrightable subject matter. Fair use, under that view, serves 
only as an exception to the property right under exigent circumstances. 
This Article will argue that fair use has served a broader, more flexible 
role to implement the other limitations. This will be termed the 
"balancing approach" to fair use. In this view, fair use should apply not 
just where transaction costs obstruct licensing, but also where mechanical 
enforcement of the copyright holder's exclusive rights would grant the 
holder excessive control over noncopyrightable elements of the work. 
This approach is consistent with the common conception of fair use as 
balancing competing interests, and contrary to the view that fair use 
should wither away as technology lowers the costs of disseminating 
143. See Patry, supra note 83, at 914-15 (arguing that copyright extension may be 
unconstitutional because it would not serve the purpose of inducing production of new 
works); see also Yen, supra note 52, at 393 (discussing possible constitutional limits). 
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works. 144 Under this rule, fair use would serve the same policies as 
copyright infringement analysis generally. 145 
The balancing approach to fair use would not simply balance the 
benefits from a particular use against the possible detriment to the 
author. 146 This would result in an unnecessarily broad view of fair 
use. Copyright exists to provide authors returns that exceed marginal 
cost. The balancing role of fair use, rather, is the same as the balancing 
function of the originality requirement, the idea/expression distinction, 
and other limitations on copyright. Each of those limitations serves to 
protect authors against free-riders (and thus provide incentives for 
authors to produce otherwise piratable public goods), but also avoids 
granting authors excessive returns. This Part will discuss how the case 
law under fair use can be broadly construed as attempting to implement 
that balance. The next Part then discusses how fair use will fit into the 
rapid expansion of digital technologies. As discussed above, some 
transaction costs will be reduced and accordingly copyright holders may 
justifiably seek revenue in settings that might have been fair use. But 
digital technologies will also lead to broader application of fair use. 
Because digital technologies involve copying as part of use, some uses 
that might have been outside the copyright holder's exclusive rights may 
now involve making a copy. Fair use may thus be necessary to prevent 
the copyright holder's exclusive right to make copies from undue control 
over the noncopyrightable aspects of her work. 
This conception of fair use is both broader and less unified than the 
transaction cost approach. Fair use, under this view, is analogous to the 
good faith doctrine in contract law. Cases finding bad faith are not 
susceptible of a single theoretical justification. 147 Rather, they resem-
ble each other in a more general way that has been compared to 
144. Fair use analysis by courts and commentators has long been framed in terms 
of balancing. although the elements described are frequently different. See, e.g., Heald. 
supra note 80, at 972 (describing fair use as the key pressure point in copyright's 
economic balance); David A. Rice, Sega and Berond: A Beacon fi,r Fair Use Analysi., 
... At Least as Far as it Goes, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1131 (1994) (arguing that fair 
use is a safety valve for settings where mechanical application of copyright's exclusive 
rights would run contrary to the fundamental principles of copyright); Kreiss, supra note 
78, at 9 (arguing copyright generally and fair use in particular strike a balance between 
incentives and access to works); see also Landes & Posner supra note 12, at 326 
(arguing copyright should strike a balance between incentive to authors and costs to 
authors of access to existing works). 
145. Cf KAPLAN, supra note I, at 68 (discussing how fair use can play a similar 
role in the infringement analysis). 
146. Cf. Fair Use, supra note 12. at 1615. 
147. See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 
88-94 (I 985). See also Inquiry, supra note 12, at 1392 (suggesting that fair use may 
serve several purposes, analogous to the various privileges in property law). 
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Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance. 148 Similarly, the resis-
tance of the fair use doctrine to simple definition, which courts and 
commentators have long bemoaned, may be key to its flexible role. 
Accordingly, this section will discuss how courts have applied fair use 
to prevent copyright owners from restricting use of copyrighted works, 
protecting functional aspects of works, controlling facts, even shielding 
governmental expenditures from criticism. In each case, transaction 
costs would not have prevented a licensing agreement; rather, applying 
fair use diminished the ability of the copyright holder to realize revenue 
from the work. This Article will further argue that such a balancing 
approach provides a more satisfying interpretation of the parody cases 
and is consistent with the Supreme Court's fair use opinions. 
Where some copying is necessary in order to use a work, courts have 
applied fair use. 149 Under the transaction cost approach, permission 
from the copyright holder would have been required, but judicial 
decisions have been to the contrary. The classic example is Crume v. 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance, in which the copyrighted book set out 
step-by-step guidelines for reorganizing corporations, complete with 
wording of model legal documents. 150 The court held that fair use 
authorized such copying as was necessary to implement the plans. 151 
Accordingly, there was no infringement where defendant copied the 
wording from the book into the documents drafted to implement such 
transactions. Similarly, Stone & McCarrick v. Dugan Piano Compa-
ny152 held that fair use permitted copying from an advertising manual, 
which had provided forms and model advertisements. 153 
Perhaps the best example of using fair use to permit access to 
uncopyrightable aspects of works is its application to computer software. 
Courts have applied fair use to authorize copying to exploit the 
unprotected functional aspects of digital technologies. 154 Such deci-
148. BURTON, supra note 147, at 91-94. 
149. Cf Litman, supra note 32, at 983-84 (discussing cases holding that copyright 
does not protect a way of doing things). 
150. Crume, 140 F.2d 182, 183 (7th Cir. 1944) (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 
99, 103 (1879)). 
15 I. Id. at 183-84. 
152. 210 F. 399 (E.D. La. 1914). 
153. Accord American Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 
1941 ). 
154. See DSC Communications v. DGI Tech., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996); Sega 
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo 
91 
sions have held that fair use authorized reverse engineering, which 
entails making a copy of a program in order to study the operational 
aspects of the program. 155 Again, the transaction cost approach would 
have yielded a different result. A license could have been negotiated 
that authorized such copying for limited purposes. But presumably the 
licensing fee would have been high, because the software copyright 
holder would often prefer to keep such functional aspects from 
disclosure, in order to maintain a competitive advantage. So if copyright 
prevented making copies necessary to figure out the unprotected 
functional aspects, then the copyright would in effect extend to the 
functional aspects of the program. By permitting reverse engineering, 
fair use thus serves to restore the balance struck in the rule that 
copyright protects only expressive, not functional aspects. 
Just as fair use permits some copying to get at the unprotected 
functional aspects of a copyrighted work, it may also have the effect of 
unlocking unprotected factual aspects of a work. In Time Incorporated 
v. Bernard Geis Associates, 156 a book about the assassination of 
of Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Sega and Atari gave rise to considerable 
commentary. See. e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other 
Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, I J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1994); Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of 
Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1091, I 126-27 (1995) (distinguishing between competition and 
usurpation); Kreiss, supra note 78; Marshall Leaffer, Engineering Competitive Policy and 
Copyright Misuse, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1087 (1994); Rice, supra note 144 at 1187-
88 ( 1994 ); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, 
Reverse Engineering, and Professor Miller, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 975 (1994); see also 
Gary R. lgnatin, Note, Let the Hackers Hack: Allowing the Reverse Engineering of 
Copyrighted Computer Programs to Achieve Compatibility, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 
(1992); Christopher W. Hager, Apples & Oranges: Reverse Engineering as a Fair Use 
After Atari v. Nintendo and Sega v. Accolade, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 259 
(1994). For a thorough discussion of the practice of reverse engineering, see Andrew 
Johnson-Laird, S()ftware Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
843 (1994 ). See also Teter, supra note 35. For a critique of the Sega rationale, see 
Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and 
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 978 
( 1993). See also Anthony L. Clapes, Confessions of an Amicus Curiae: Technophobia, 
Law, and Creativity in the Digital Arts, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 903 (1994). 
155. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games 
Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Professor Cohen has argued 
persuasively that such cases serve the overall objectives of copyright law and provide 
a guide toward the role of fair use in adapting copyright law to new technologies. See 
Cohen, supra note 154, at 1130-34; see also Bateman v. Mnemonics, 79 F.3d 1532 (11th 
Cir. 1996); Vanessa Marsland, Copyright Protection and Reverse Engineering of 
Software-An EC/UK Perspective, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1021 (1994); Paul Durdik, 
Reverse Engineering as a Fair Use Defense to Software Copyright Infringement, 34 
JURIMETRICS J. 451 (1994). 
156. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
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President Kennedy illustrated its theories by borrowing from a copyright-
ed work, the home movie of the event made by a spectator, Abraham 
Zapruder. 157 Working from frames of the movie (which were publicly 
available as exhibits to the Warren Commission report on the assassina-
tion), defendants made charcoal sketches representing the scene as 
portrayed in the movie. 158 
Courts have also used fair use in a more subtle way to balance the 
incentives of copyright by distinguishing between "productive" and 
"reproductive" uses. 159 A reproductive use simply makes copies that 
compete with the copies authorized by the copyright holder. 160 Where 
a use is productive, however, defendant goes beyond copying to 
contribute some independent value. 161 Productive uses have been more 
likely to qualify for fair use. Making a copy of a computer program in 
order to study it as a process of writing other programs would be a 
productive use. 162 Copying a program in order to sell it in competition 
with the copyright holder would be a less favored reproductive use. 163 
The transaction cost approach would give much less weight to the 
productive nature of the use. If the new use was productive, then 
presumably an appropriate licensing fee could be paid from the surplus 
created. 164 Moreover, requiring licensing fees would enable the 
copyright holder to determine which uses were the most productive and 
157. Id. 
158. Id. Commentators have argued that fair use should apply where some copying 
is necessary to get at uncopyrighted aspects of a work. See Cate, supra note 8, at 1455 
(arguing that fair use should apply where the user reproduces facts and ideas from a 
copyrighted work); Heald, supra note 32, at 262 n.121 (arguing fair use would permit 
copying of a copyrighted English translation of a public domain Latin hymn in order to 
extract the public domain aspects). 
159. See Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair 
Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677 (1995); William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair 
Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 
667 (1993). 
160. See Lape, supra note 159. 
161. Id. 
162. See Bateman v. Mnemonics, 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); Sega Enters. Ltd. 
v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 
F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
163. Cf Allen-Myland v. Int'! Bus. Machs. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 533-35 (E.D. 
Pa. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 33 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 1994); accord Cable/Home 
Communication v. Network Prods., 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990) (denying fair use to 
wholesale copying of a chip). 
164. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note I, at 10.43. 
93 
license them accordingly. 165 But such failure to recognize the produc-
tive nature of some uses permits the copyright holder to capture as much 
as possible of the new value created by such uses. It could also have 
perverse effects on the incentives created by copyright. 166 If copyright 
holders have a greater ability to capture the value created by their work 
than do other activities, than resources could be channeled toward 
creation of copyrightable works and away from other productive 
activities not protected by such a monopoly. 167 
Fair use can also serve to implement the more narrow limitations on 
copyrightable subject matter. Works of the United States government 
are not subject to copyright protection. 168 Because the government has 
funded the work, copyright is not necessary to provide an incentive for 
its creation. Moreover, granting the government exclusive rights to 
control dissemination of its products raises serious questions about 
accountability. The decision of Wojnarowicz v. American Family 
Association 169 introduced such policy matters into the fair use balance. 
In Wojnarowicz, federal funds supported an art exhibit. 170 Defendant, 
who objected to the content of the exhibit, published a pamphlet that 
reproduced parts of the supposedly objectionable works. 171 Because 
federal funds had supported display and dissemination of the works, the 
court reasoned that fair use would be more broadly construed, to permit 
copying if it were necessary in order to object to use of tax revenues. 
The previous Part discussed how the transaction cost approach 
provides an unsatisfactory explanation of the fair use parody cases. 172 
The ready application of fair use to parody is better understood as 
implementing the principle that the author has no control over the ideas 
expressed in their work. In order to free others to attack those ideas, a 
165. 17 U.S.C. § l07 (Supp. 1995). Rather, the transaction cost approach would 
tend to limit favored uses to those categories specifically named in the statute: "criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching ... scholarship, or research." See GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note I, at l0.2- I0.2. l. 
166. See Lunney, supra note 18. 
167. See KAPLAN, supra note I, at 75 (warning that excessive copyright protection 
could attract "too much of the nation's energy into the copyright-protected sectors of the 
economy"); Lunney, supra note 18, at 489 (proposing that, in order to prevent copyright 
from creating allocative inefficiencies, that copyright should "produce works of 
authorship if, and only if, such production would represent the most highly valued use 
of their resources"). 
168. 17 U.S.C. § l07 (1995). 
169. 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 130-36. On the need for a theory of 
parody, see Brian R. Landy, Comment, The Two Strands of the Fair Use Web: A 
Theory for Resolving the Dilemma of Music Parody, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 227 ( 1993). 
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parody may be permitted as fair use. Parody also illustrates the role of 
status considerations. In those cases where the author does control the 
copyright, the author is likely to refuse permission to a parody because 
of status considerations. 
A contest between superheroes illustrates the ill fit of the transaction 
cost approach with parody. In Warner Brothers, Incorporated v. 
American Broadcasting, Incorporated, 173 ABC's television program 
"The Greatest American Hero" parodied Superman with a more diffident 
superhero. As discussed above, the transaction cost approach would 
justify the application of fair use by an author's presumed unwillingness 
to license a parody. But this was not a setting where the author's tender 
feelings would have prevented a voluntary licensing transaction. The 
original authors of Superman had sold their copyright in the cartoons 
many years ago, and were now living in modest circumstances. 174 
The copyright to Superman was held by a corporation, which has shown 
considerable interest in maximizing the revenue from Superman. Indeed, 
the parties had considered a licensing agreement. Nor was the parody 
one which would have so offended the author as to prevent permission. 
Rather, the program very gently poked fun at some of the standard parts 
of the Superman stories. So a better explanation of the application of 
fair use is that it permits authors to parody other works without 
permission because such freedom fosters the creativity that copyright 
exists to support. 
The balancing approach also provides a more coherent basis for the 
recent fair use decisions of the Supreme Court. As noted above, Harper 
& Row has been interpreted as following the transaction approach to fair 
use. In holding that fair use did not authorize the Nation to print several 
hundred words of Gerald Ford's autobiography, the Court indicated that 
fair use should apply where a reasonable copyright owner would have 
consented to the use. 175 Harper & Row is entirely consistent with a 
balancing approach to fair use. One could argue that fair use should 
have applied in order to prevent control over noncopyrighted facts. But 
the Nation could have reported the relevant facts without taking Ford's 
173. 720 F.2d 23 I (2d Cir. 1983). 
174. See Robert McG. Thomas, Jr., Jerry Siegel, Superman's Creator, Dies at 81, 
NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 31, I 996, at B6 (relating how the creator of Superman sold the 
copyright in 1938 for $130 and thereafter worked as a messenger and a typist). 
175. 471 U.S. at 563 (citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT§ l.JO[C] (1996)). 
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expression of them. Rather, the Nation quoted entire passages of Ford's 
writing. The Court stated that some direct quotation may have been 
necessary to convey the facts, such as Ford's "characterization of the 
White House tapes as the 'smoking gun,"' 176 but most of the facts 
could have been paraphrased. 
Harper & Row frames fair use as whether a "reasonable" copyright 
holder would have consented to the use. One can read that as asking 
whether the copyright holder would have agreed to license the use, had 
transaction costs not interfered. 177 But that requires a departure from 
the normal understanding of the reasonable person standard. Judge 
Learned Hand, whose landmark opinions continue to set the terms for 
copyright analysis, certainly gave a different content to the test in the 
familiar formulation from United States v. Carroll Towing, 178 which 
questions whether a reasonable person would take a precaution by asking 
whether the cost of the precaution is less than the expected damages to 
the potential victim. The test forces the actor to consider both the costs 
to themself and to the potential victim-a balancing test. Similarly, fair 
use can balance the incentives to the author against the costs to potential 
users. Thus, under Harper & Row, fair use analysis would certainly 
consider whether the copyright holder would have sought a licensing fee 
for the use. But where a fee would have included a premium traceable 
to protection of noncopyrightable material (such as functional or factual 
aspects of the work), a court could hold that a reasonable copyright 
owner would not have sought such leverage. 
A recent case concerning a videotape of a notorious incident shows 
how the transaction cost approach is too narrow to address the necessary 
concems. 179 The Los Angeles News Service videotaped the assault of 
a truck-driver during disturbances in Los Angeles. The news service 
licensed other media outlets to show the tape for a fee. One local 
television station copied and showed portions of the tape without 
permission, and raised the defense of fair use. Under the transaction 
cost approach, the case is straightforward. Fair use would clearly be 
inapplicable, because the use could have been licensed. But the case, 
like Harper & Row raises issues of protection of facts and matters of 
176. 471 U.S. at 550 (quoting ALAN LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHT WORKS 
(1958), reprinted as Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 14-16, 
prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1960)). 
177. See Netanel, supra note 24, at 307 n.98. 
178. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
179. Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th. Cir. 
1997). 
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public concern that require a closer examination, although a balancing 
analysis might well reach the same result on those particular facts. 
The other recent key Supreme Court decision on fair use, Sony 
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, 180 reads much more 
consistently with a balancing approach than with the transaction cost 
approach. In Sony, the holders of copyrights in television programs 
sought to hold the manufacturers of videocassette recorders liable for 
contributory copyright infringement, for selling machines that consumers 
used to copy television programs. 181 The Court held that fair use 
authorized individuals to "time-shift" programs, to tape programs for 
later viewing. Transaction costs would indeed prevent licensing in 
individual situations. It would be quixotic for a student to seek 
permission from Monty Python to tape an episode while the student was 
in class. But such transaction costs do not justify fair use where 
mechanisms exist for collective licensing. If Sony had denied fair use, 
then VCR manufacturers could have arranged to pay a royalty from 
VCR sales to organizations representing television copyright holders. 182 
Rather, Sony rests on the idea that a copyright holder's prerogatives 
should not give it control over markets beyond the market for its work. 
If the Sony court had denied fair use, then the television copyright 
holders would have effectively controlled not just the market for their 
work but also the market for video cassette recorders. 183 
The transaction cost approach is also hard to square with the many 
cases holding that some types of harm to the copyright holder will be 
disregarded in the fair use analysis. 184 Hustler Magazine v. Moral 
Majority 185 held it was fair use for the Moral Majority to reproduce 
180. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
181. Id.; see also Ariel B. Taitz, Comment, Removing Road Blocks Along the 
Information Superhighway: Facilitating the Dissemination of New Technology by 
Changing the Law of Contributory Copyright Infringement, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 133 
(I 995). 
182. See Fair Use, supra note 12, at 1656; see also Stanley M. Besen, Sheila N. 
Kirby & Steven C. Salop, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 383 (1992). 
183. Id. 
184. One can provide for such holdings by broadening the understanding of "market 
failure" to include settings where the copyright holder refuses to license a use out of 
"anti-dissemination" motives. See Fair Use, supra note 12, at 1632-35. 
185. 796 F.2d I 148 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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material from Hustler magazine in its fund-raising circular. 186 Con-
sumers Union of United States v. General Signal Corporation 187 
upheld use in advertising of passages from the Consumer Report's 
product assessments, even if such use could arguably damage Consumer 
Report's credibility. National Rifle Association of America v. Handgun 
Control Federation of Ohio 188 held fair use authorized distribution of 
a list of legislators prepared by a lobbying organization. In such cases, 
transaction costs were not the obstacle to licensing. Rather, fair use was 
appropriately applied to prevent the copyright holder's exclusive right to 
make copies from becoming an instrument for controlling the flow of 
ideas. 
Fair use can thus be interpreted as a tool to implement the core 
limitations on copyright, rather than simply a device to apply when 
transaction costs obstruct licensing agreements. The next Part contrasts 
the analysis of the balancing and transaction cost approaches in several 
settings. 
IV. APPLICATIONS 
This Part takes problems in fair use (from cases, proposed legislation, 
and life in the digital age) and compares the transaction cost and 
balancing approaches. Rather than a detailed application of the statutory 
factors, this Article will focus on the key differences between the two 
modes of analysis. The transaction cost approach (rooted in the 
privatization view of copyright) focusses on the question, whether the 
parties could have reached an agreement to license the use. The 
balancing approach (seeing fair use as balancing incentives) goes on to 
consider whether denying fair use would effectively grant the copyright 
186. See Fisher, supra note I, at 1741 n.352; see also New Era Publications Int'!. 
v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990) (use of author's writings in an 
unfavorable biography deemed unlikely to harm sales for authorized biography); 
Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986) (use in writings against 
legalized abortion deemed unlikely to overlap market for pro-choice writings); 
Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (reproduc-
tion of federally supported artwork in pamphlet opposing funding for National 
Endowment for the Arts deemed not competing in market for art); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky 
Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (no cognizable market harm in parody 
use of Pillsbury doughboy); but see Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 
706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding market for artist's work could be harmed by advertisement 
copying his work, on grounds that it suggested artist had licensed the use). 
187. 724 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Arica Inst. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067 
(2d Cir. 1992); Mathieson v. Associated Press, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1685 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (no 
showing that use by a new service harmed the market for copies of a photograph of a 
bulletproof vest endorsed by Oliver North). 
188. 15 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 1994). 
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holder a measure of control over noncopyrightable aspects of the work, 
such as ideas, functional aspects, or markets other than those to sell or 
license the work. The fair use issues discussed here involve quite 
different types of copying: copying a letter to comment on its author, 
copying a computer program in the process of using it, copying a digital 
work while circumventing anti-copying technology, copying cartoon 
characters to comment on their cultural place, copying a web page to 
include it in a massive archive, and photocopying scholarly works for 
students and researchers. The transaction cost approach would accord 
presumptive control over copying to the copyright holder, unless 
negotiating a license were impractical. The balancing approach would 
consider whether the type of use at issue should be beyond the control 
of the copyright holder. A case that encapsulates the contrast is Lish v. 
Harper's Magazine Foundation. 189 Harper's Magazine printed lengthy 
excerpts from the letter of a writing teacher sent to solicit students for 
a writing seminar. 190 The letter both reflected the unusually secretive 
nature of the seminars and showed the teacher's rather eccentric writing 
style. The court denied fair use in terms consonant with the privatiza-
tion approach, holding that the teacher should be able to strictly control 
distribution of his writing. A balancing approach would have more 
given weight to the letter's status as a record of the writing style of 
someone holding himself out as a writing teacher. Publishing excerpts 
of the letter would not compete with sales of the author's work, although 
the implicit criticism might have hurt the teacher's reputation. Fair use, 
under a balancing approach, could serve to prevent such an author from 
controlling debate about his work. 
Moving to a broader problem, fair use could help adjust copyright law 
to the prevalence of copying as an aspect of both use and dissemination 
of digital works. In particular, fair use can provide a tempered approach 
to the issue of whether a temporary copy in the working memory of a 
computer constitutes a copy for the purposes of copyright law. 191 At 
the risk of oversimplifying, a computer generally uses two types of 
189. 807 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
190. Id. 
191. On the fixation issue, see, e.g., Douglas J. Masson, Comment, Fixation on 
Fixation: Why Imposing Old Copyright La\\' on Ne\\' Technology Will Not Work, 71 IND. 
L.J. 1049 (1996). 
99 
memory: permanent memory and working memory. 192 Suppose an 
individual owns a personal computer with various types of software 
loaded onto it. While the computer is turned off, the software will sit 
in the permanent memory (which could include the computer's hard 
disk, ROM chips, the floppy disks distributed in its vicinity, compact 
discs or other media such as tapes). When the computer is turned on, 
it activates its working memory. Any software that the computer 
accesses must be copied from permanent memory into working memory, 
because the processor of the computer works primarily with that small, 
fast, dynamic memory. So the operating system software (which runs 
the computer) and any applications software (broadly understood, 
anything that the user uses or interacts with other than the operating 
systems software) all must be copied to the extent they are used. So to 
utilize a computer program, indeed even to tum on a computer, causes 
some software to be copied within the computer. Courts have held that 
making such a temporary copy constitutes making a copy for the 
purposes of copyright law. 193 
Some have argued that a temporary copy within a computer's working 
memory should not constitute a copy for the purposes of copyright 
law. 194 In this view, one makes a copy only by making a permanent 
copy. Implementing that view might require a shift in judicial authority 
or an amendment of the present wording of the copyright statute. 195 
But, more fundamentally, excepting temporary copies from the scope of 
192. One could also use the terms random access memory and permanent storage. 
See IBM DICTIONARY OF COMPUTING 506, 554 (1994). 
I 93. This aspect of the decision followed the holding of MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak 
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th. Cir. 1993). See Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on 
the "Information Superhighway": Authors. Exploiters. and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1476 (1995) (collecting criticism of the MAI decision). For 
criticisms of the MAI decision on various grounds, see Trinnie Arriola, Software 
Copyright Infringement Claims After MAI Systems v. Peak, 69 WASH. U. L. REV. 405 
(1994). See also Katrine Levin, MAI v. PEAK: Should Loading Operating System 
Software Into RAM Constitute Copyright Infringement?, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
649 (1994); Michael E. Johnson, Note, The Uncertain Future of Computer Software 
Users' Rights in the Aftermath of MAI Systems, 44 DUKE L.J. 327 (1994). 
194. See Cate, supra note 8, at 1453 ("There is considerable logical support for 
finding that RAM is not fixed.") (citing Pamela Samuelson, The Nil Intellectual Property 
Report, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 21, 22-23 (Dec. 1994); Jessica Litman, The 
Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 42 (1994-95)). See also 
Lemley, supra note 25, at l015-16 n.122 (collecting authority on the temporary copy 
issue). 
195. Cf Johnson, supra note 193. The issue of whether temporary RAM or screen 
"copies" are sufficiently fixed to qualify as copies for the purposes of copyright law has 
not been definitively settled. See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing With Overlapping 
Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 542 (1997) (discussing statutory 
issue and authorities on point). 
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copyright law could threaten the legitimate rights of copyright holders, 
by permitting dissemination of copies if recipients did not save them in 
permanent form. 196 On the other hand, mechanically treating a 
temporary copy made without permission of the copyright holder as 
infringement can swing the pendulum too far in the opposite direction. 
The case law on the potential liability of computer maintenance 
providers shows the hazards of such reasoning. 197 The leading case, 
Triad Systems v. Southeastern Express, 198 provides a good example. 
Triad Systems made computers used by automotive parts dealers for 
various bookkeeping tasks. 199 Triad sold the software that ran the 
computers and performed the bookkeeping functions.2'JO Triad also 
sold its services to maintain Triad computers, in competition with an 
independent service organization. 201 To service a Triad computer, the 
196. See Michael D. McCoy & Needham J. Boddie, II, Cybertheft: Will Copyright 
law Prevent Digital Tyranny on the Superhighway?, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169 
(1995); see also David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity 
Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 139, 151 
n. 29 (1996) (discussing use of anonymous remailers to post documents that allegedly 
infringed copyrights). Even if temporary copies were not subject to the exclusive 
reproduction right, however, such dissemination might infringe the exclusive distribution 
right. See Lemley, supra note 195, at IL B (discussing application of distribution right 
in the network context). Several legislative attempts have, so far unsuccessfully, 
attempted relatively narrow authorization of coping for the purpose of using a program 
or servicing a computer. See Bill Would Permit 'Rightful Possessor' of Program to 
Authorize Copying, 49 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 303 (1995) (analyzing 
proposed bill that would authorize rightful possessor, rather than just the owner, of a 
program to authorize loading into RAM). Legislation has also been proposed that would 
authorize the making of a copy of a program where such copy was made solely by 
activation of the computer for maintenance. See H.R. 1861, 104th Cong.§ 7(3) (1995). 
197. See Triad Sys. v. Southeastern Express, 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp 356 (E.D. Va. 1994); MAI 
Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Pamela 
Samuelson, Modifying Copyrighted Software: Adjusting Copyright Doctrine to 
Accommodate A Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 179 (1987). 
198. 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995). Triad has been criticized as extending the power 
of copyright holders beyond the market for the copyrighted work into the market for 
services. See Lemley, supra note 25, at 1025-26, 1025 n.179; Stephen M. McJohn, Fair 
Use of Copyrighted Software, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 593 (1997). See also Chad G. Asarch, 
Note, Is Turn About Fair Play? Copyright Law and the Fair Use of Computer Software 
Loaded Into RAM, 95 MICH. L. REV. 654 (1996) (concluding that consideration of the 
statutory fair use factors should authorize an ISO loading software into RAM). 
199. Triad, 64 F.3d at 1333. 
200. Id. 
201. For other cases involving manufacturers and independent service organizations, 
see Service & Training v. Data General, 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting 
101 
independent servicer would run the software provided with the computer, 
including the operating system, utilities and diagnostic programs, which 
would require that the software be copied from the permanent storage 
(either the computer's hard disk or a tape drive) into the computer's 
working memory. 202 The Ninth Circuit held that such use did not 
constitute fair use, in terms that track the transaction cost approach. 
Under the balancing approach to fair use, however, the independent 
servicer would likely qualify for fair use. 203 The servicer was making 
a productive use of the software that was copied. The use also sought 
to exploit the functional aspects of the work, to use it in order to service 
the very computer the software was provided with. Although the Ninth 
Circuit did not explore the issue, it is also likely that the servicer was 
employing nonoriginal as well as original aspects of Triad's work.204 
It seems unlikely that Triad wrote operating system software and 
applications software without using other programs as models or even 
incorporating code from public domain sources.205 Applying fair use 
would prevent a computer manufacturer from having a monopoly on the 
market to service such computers, a market separate from the market for 
software to run on the computers. 
The balancing approach also leads to less strict protection than has 
been proposed for digital "copyright management."206 Nascent 
technologies promise the ability to code copies of digital works to permit 
argument that manufacturer misused software copyright through licensing restrictions). 
See also Datagate v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Indep. 
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust, 910 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Kan. 1995); Advanced Computer Servs. of 
Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
202. Triad, 64 F.3d at I 333. 
203. For a discussion of how the application of fair use in Triad would prevent 
excessive copyright protection, see McJohn, supra note 198. 
204. For a recent case holding that a plaintiff copyright holder could survive a 
motion for summary judgment without identifying the original components of the alleged 
infringed work, see Fonar Corp. v. Robert Domenick, 105 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997). 
205. Trends in intellectual property law affect the use of existing software in the 
process of software production. See Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encourag-
ing Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255 (1996). 
206. For a thorough discussion of copyright management technologies, proposed 
federal legislation, and possible constitutional dimensions to the issue, see Julie E. 
Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in 
Cyber.1pace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) [hereinafter Copyright Management]; Julie 
E. Cohen, Some Reflections 011 Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to 
Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (1997) [hereinafter Reflections]. See also 
Sherri L. Burr, The Piracy Gap: Protecting Intellectual Property in an Era of Artistic 
Creativity and Technological Change. 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 245 (1997); Michael 
Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet Security, 10 HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 213 (1995). 
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copyright holders to closely monitor and control any use made of the 
copies: 
Thus, for example, if I purchase a collection of essays online, the copyright 
owner can charge me for the file containing the essays, generate a record of my 
identity and what I have purchased, and insert pieces of microcode into the file 
that will: (I) notify the copyright owner every time I "open" one of the essays 
and specify which one I opened; (2) notify me when I must remit additional 
fees to the copyright owner-this much to browse the essay, this much to print 
it out, this much to extract an excerpt, and so on; and (3) prevent me from 
opening, printing, or excerpting the piece until I have paid. 20 
One catch to using technological devices to prevent copying is that 
people can figure out ways around them, As a lexicon of computer 
jargon puts it: "copy protection: n. A class of methods for preventing 
incompetent pirates from stealing software and legitimate customers from 
using it Considered silly,"208 Proposed legislation in Congress would 
give copyright holders considerable legal weapons against anyone who 
tried to circumvent such protections, It would be illegal to provide 
devices or services that "avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or otherwise 
circumvent" such copyright management systems.209 It would likewise 
be illegal to tamper with "copyright management information," broadly 
defined to include not just the name of the copyright holder but any 
terms and conditions the owner proposes for use of the work.210 
Because such works are precisely the ones for which fair use would no 
longer be available (transaction costs having been shrunk by the 
207. Copyright Management, supra note 206, at 981-82. 
208. THE NEW HACKER'S DICTIONARY (Eric s. Raymond ed., 2d ed. 1993). Some 
have suggested that copyright holders should be expected to rely on such technologies 
in lieu of, rather than in addition to, the protections of copyright law. See Eric 
Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why Copyright Law 
Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 38-49 (1997) 
(discussing how various technologies could substitute for protections of copyright law). 
209. Copyright Management, supra note 206, at 990. A closely related issue is the 
enforceability of such terms. See Lemley, supra note 22 (discussing enforceability of 
"shrinkwrap" terms proposed in network transactions); John E. Murray, Jr., The 
Emerging Article 2: The Latest Iteration, 35 Duo. L. REV. 533, 550-65 (I 997) 
(discussing proposed revision of the Uniform Commercial Code that would govern 
whether standard terms became part of the contract in many electronic transactions); 
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based 
Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53 (1997) (discussing tensions between federal 
copyright law and state contract law); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits 
of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY L.J. 93 (1997). 
210. Copyright Management, supra note 206, at 990. 
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copyright holder posting terms for use), fair use would presumably not 
excuse any such tampering; nor does the proposed statute make these 
strict protections subject to fair use. Such stringent protection follows 
as a matter of course from the transaction approach. Copyright owners 
may attach to each copy precise terms for any possible use and any user 
must either agree to and abide by those terms or go elsewhere. The 
balancing approach to fair use would suggest a more tempered approach. 
Recognizing that the copyright protection code locks up not just 
copyrighted expression but also unprotected ideas and nonoriginal 
elements, a balancing approach would amend (or interpret) the proposed 
statute to allow access in some settings, even if that involved circum-
venting the protective coding. 
It is instructive to compare the proposed high level of protection for 
copyright management technology with the present, considerably lower 
level of protection for the artistic integrity of works. Under Section 
106A, the author of a work of visual art may prevent others from 
distorting, mutilating, or destroying the work.211 But these protections 
are sharply circumscribed. The moral rights apply only to works like 
painting, sculpture and limited edition photographs, and specifically 
exclude works for hire.212 Moreover, the moral rights are specifically 
made subject to fair use. 213 So although it may be legal to distort or 
mutilate a digital artwork, it may soon be illegal to fiddle with the 
legalese attached to it. A balancing approach would avoid such an 
incongruity. 
211. 11 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). See also Jane C. Ginsburg. Copyright in the 
101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural 
Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 477 (1990); 
Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists Moral Rights: A Comparative 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (1997) (discussing whether 
copyright doctrines in the United States perform a similar function to moral rights in 
other jurisdictions in controlling reputational externalities); Geri Yonover, The 
Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody. and Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 79 (1996). 
212. 17 U.S.C. § IOI (1994) (The definition of "work of visual art" defines the 
scope of the moral rights conferred under section 106A. ). Moral rights could also be 
based upon existing common law concepts. See Edward J. Damich, The Right of 
Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 
23 GA. L. REV. I (I 988). The exclusive right to make derivative works can be seen as 
equivalent to moral rights. See J. H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools-The 
Outer Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 797, 813 
(1991 ). 
213. 17 U.S.C. § I 07 (I 995). Whether fair use is properly applicable as a limit to 
an artist's moral rights has been questioned. See Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the 
Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 38 (1997) 
(arguing that "fair use and federal moral rights are inherently incompatible" and calling 
for courts to ignore the statutory language). 
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Another area that would be treated differently under the transaction 
cost and balancing approaches is fair use in creating derivative works. 
The logic of privatization favors broad protection of the exclusive right 
to make derivative works (the right to recast the work into new forms). 
Concentrating the right to make derivative works in a single person 
would give an incentive to exploit that right in the most efficient 
manner. Along these lines, granting the copyright holder in a book the 
exclusive right to make a film based on the book is thought to avoid a 
"multiple taker" problem. 214 Unless a single person has the right to 
make the film of the book, no one would have the incentive to invest the 
many millions of dollars now necessary to make a feature film. This 
claim is certainly debatable as an empirical matter. The recent spate of 
Jane Austen films, all based on public domain material, certainly shows 
that exclusive rights to a book are not essential to permit the necessary 
investment in a movie. More important, the logic of this approach 
would lead to a broad interpretation of the derivative right, in order to 
prevent unauthorized competitors. Such a broad interpretation would 
stifle not just commercial competition, but permit the copyright holder 
to control the cultural view of the work. Under the balancing approach, 
the copyright holder would still have the right to make derivative works, 
but the leeway afforded to comment, criticism, and other uses would be 
much greater. 
To take an example, the privatization approach would support the 
holding in Walt Disney Production v. Air Pirates. 215 The defendants 
in Disney produced a counterculture comic that portrayed various Disney 
characters engaged in distinctly nonDisney activities, such as drug use 
and bawdy behavior.216 The Ninth Circuit denied fair use.217 Such 
a result reflects the privatization rationale of the transaction cost 
approach, which would leave it to Disney to decide on the most effective 
commercial exploitation of its characters. If the public demand for 
works portraying Disney characters in such a light were sufficient, then 
Disney itself could produce them. If Disney were concerned that such 
comics could adversely affect its use of the characters in other areas, 
however, then Disney could prevent any such works. A balancing 
214. See Netanel, supra note 24. 




approach to fair use, however, might reach a different result. Portrayals 
of Disney characters so engaged might well harm the sales of Disney 
products, but not in a way that would favor Disney in the balance of 
incentives. The comics would not substitute for Disney's sales of its 
copyrighted work. Rather, the comics effectively brought into question 
the role that Disney characters play culturally. 218 
Air Pirates also shows another flaw in maximizing reliance on 
voluntary licensing to produce new works incorporating elements of 
existing works. The author of an existing work is likely to be consider-
ably more risk averse than other authors who wish to incorporate it into 
new works. Thus, Disney would balance possible revenues from a new 
work against the risks to sales of previous works, thus considerably 
discounting the value to Disney of using its characters in new ways. 
An author with no vested interest in the existing works is more likely to 
try something risky. Willingness to take risks is often a key ingredient 
to creative work. Accordingly, granting authors expanded control over 
new uses of their work is likely to have considerable dampening effects 
on cultural flourishing. This certainly does not counsel depriving 
copyright holders of the control over markets for their work or of 
derivative works that spring from their work. But it does suggest that 
the bounds of fair use cannot be set simply by asking whether a use 
could have been licensed. The privatization view confuses the change 
in an idea with the depletion of a resource.219 As discussed above, a 
strong reason for privatizing physical property is that placing it in private 
218. For another case in which use of Disney material was not protected as parody 
under fair use. see Walt Disney Productions v. Mature Pictures Corp .. 389 F. Supp. I 397 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (rejecting fair use of Disney·s "Mickey Mouse March," performed by 
actors wearing nothing but Mouseketeer hats in the film The Life and Times of the 
Happy Hooker). The Ninth Circuit recently held fair use inapplicable to a parody of The 
Cat in the Hat, rewritten to be an account of the O.J. Simpson case. See Dr. Seuss 
Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., I 09 F. 3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). The court held 
that the parody used copyrighted elements not in order to comment on the original but 
simply to gain attention. Id. The balancing approach would deny fair use where the 
parody form was used simply as a means of free-riding, as opposed to employing the 
ideas, or on criticizing or commenting on the style of the original. See also Castle Rock 
Entertainment v. Carol Publ'g, 955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying fair use to 
a book of trivia questions about the television series Seinfeld, where the book used 
significant portions of copyrighted shows with relatively little additional material); David 
London, Comment, Toon Town: Do Cartoon Crossovers Merit Fair Use Protection?, 
38 B.C. L. REV. 145 (1996) (arguing that fair use authorizes parody in cartoon of 
characters from other cartoons). At some point, using copyright to stop critical speech 
raises constitutional questions. See Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 
70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 ( 1970): E. Walter Van Valkenburg, The First Amendment in 
Cyberspace, 75 OR. L. REV. 319 (1996). 
219. See Lemley, supra note 25, at I 049 (noting that ideas, unlike real property, 
cannot be subjected to "over-use"). 
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hands allows market forces to allocate it to the highest valued use. But 
informational works are not depleted, rather they are tested, propagated, 
and transformed through use. 
The transaction cost and balancing approaches would also yield 
different results on whether copyrights are being infringed by a project 
currently underway to archive the Internet's World-Wide Web.220 
Under the transaction cost approach, such an effort would likely not 
qualify for fair use, particularly if such archiving exceeded any limitation 
stated expressly on the web page or elsewhere. The makers of such an 
archive are in a position to use market forces to capture the benefits of 
their effort, by charging access fees to anyone who wants to utilize the 
archive. The archivists would only have to pay web page authors who 
demanded payments, not everyone on the entire Internet. So if 
transaction costs were the guide, fair use might not authorize the project. 
By contrast, the balancing approach would likely hold the archiving to 
be fair use, even where it exceeded the permission granted by individual 
web page authors.221 The archive has considerable historical and 
research values and has little effect on the incentives of authors. 
Moreover, much of what the archive would capture would not be 
covered by copyright. Many web pages contain noncopyrightable facts 
on functional aspects, as well as copyrightable expression. So a 
balancing analysis would likely permit archiving as fair use. 
In each of the foregoing examples, the transaction cost approach yields 
a simple but troubling analysis, because it excludes important policy 
considerations. The balancing approach may require a more complicated 
analysis, but that simply reflects the fact that the distinctions on which 
copyright relies are complex. Concepts like originality, ideas, and 
functionality have defied easy definition and will continue to do so. 
The recent controversial decisions on photocopying illustrate how the 
balancing approach supplements, rather than displaces, the transaction 
220. Brewster Kahle, Preserving the Internet, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Mar. 1997, 
at 82. The archivists are presently addressing the issue simply by letting authors exclude 
their works. Id. On how networked communication may assist the law, see Michael 
Rustad, Legal Resources for Lawyers Lost in Cyberspace, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 317 
(1996); Eugene Volokh, Computer Media For the Legal Profession, 94 MICH. L REV. 
2058 (1996), 
221. A rather widespread but open issue is the extent to which fair use authorizes 
caching of files posted on the Internet. See Cyberspace Law Institute, Copyright Law 
on the Internet: The Special Problem of Caching and Copyright Protection (last 
modified Sept. I, 1995) <http://www.cli.org/Caching.html>. 
107 
cost approach. In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 222 Texaco 
maintained a library of scientific and technical journals. Texaco 
regularly informed its researchers of recently published articles and 
provided photocopies of articles to the researchers upon request. In 
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services,223 a 
copyshop received lists of book excerpts from university instructors, 
made photocopies of the excerpts and sold them bundled into 
coursepacks. Appellate courts ultimately denied fair use in both cases. 
Both cases involve uses favored in fair use analysis, research and 
education.224 Nonetheless, neither appears to be a case where the 
copyright holder was seeking protection of unprotected aspects of the 
work. Had this been a competitor trying to impede Texaco's research, 
an author seeking to keep critical students from reading the work, or a 
software producer worried that young hackers might figure out its 
programs and write better ones, then fair use would be more apt. But, 
at the risk of oversimplifying, both cases boiled down to a commercial 
entity systematically providing a cheaper source of copies than the 
copyright holder. Certainly, fair use would likely apply if the potential 
user could not otherwise get copies at a reasonable price. But if Texaco 
could fund copies from the revenues following from its research, or if 
students could purchase copies at a reasonable price ( or, more likely, if 
the publishers would license photocopies of excerpts to be made), then 
denying fair use could simply be enforcing the balance struck by the 
general outline of copyright law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The transaction cost approach might simplify fair use analysis. But 
the clarification of the doctrine would only distort the overall effect of 
copyright law. Mechanical enforcement of the exclusive rights in some 
settings could effectively give copyright holders a measure of control 
over noncopyrightable ideas and functional aspects of their work. Such 
a prospect, in turn, would simply shift the balancing concerns to the 
infringement analysis. Clarifying fair use by surgically narrowing it 
would only complicate other areas of copyright law. The difficulty in 
222. 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994). 
223. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane), cen. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1336 (1997). 
224. One might argue for applying fair use on redistributive grounds, on the basis 
that students and researchers are favored classes of users. See Merges, supra note 18. 
See also Anna M. Budde, Comment, Photocopying for Research: A Fair Use Exception 
Favoring the Progress of Science and the Useful Ans, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1999 (1996) 
( arguing that fair use authorizes photocopying of scientific research articles in both 
industry and universities). 
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fair use simply reflects the difficulty in defining the boundaries of 
copyright. Fair use originally arose as part of the infringement analysis 
in copyright cases.225 Fair use has served to adapt copyright to several 
generations of technology, but has become a tangled doctrine in the 
process. The transaction cost approach bids to reduce fair use to a 
simple, quantifiable analysis and remove it from the core issues of 
copyright. But copyright law will adapt to digital technologies best by 
retaining its flexibility. 226 Fair use can serve as a means to implement 
the other limits on copyright. The works subject to copyright are 
increasingly being created and disseminated in digital forms, and digital 
technologies copy works repeatedly for many functions. A balanced 
approach to fair use can help protect the copyright holder's prerogatives 
while preserving the limitations on those exclusive rights. 
225. See FAIR USE, supra note I, at 18-64 (discussing early development of fair use 
in United States case law); see also KAPLAN, supra note I, at 67-70. 
226. See KAPLAN, supra note I, at 69-70 (arguing that fair use analysis invokes 
policy considerations just as much as the rest of the infringement analysis). 
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